GHSA-M5PQ-69XG-VCQ3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 20:41 – Updated: 2026-08-18 20:41Impact
If the replication protocol is enabled by using the primary (or deprecated master) role for a server instance, then the +changelog URL route can be used to read the complete database content including password hashes, and the ids and salts of tokens from devpi-tokens by using a trivially modified GET request.
The leaked hashes use the argon2 algorithm, so they are not immediately at risk by brute-force methods, but dictionary attacks are feasible. If a database leak could have happened, it is advised to change the passwords after a patched version or other mitigation is in place.
When devpi-tokens is in use, the quality of the server secret is important. It might be possible to derive the server secret if actual tokens are public by using similar techniques to finding the password for a hash. If a database leak could have happened and any tokens are public, it is advised to change the server secret.
Besides the information leak this can be used to produce significant CPU, IO and bandwidth usage depending on the database size.
Patches
The logic bug causing this issue is fixed with devpi-server 6.20.2 and devpi-server 7.0.0b3.
Workarounds
When replication isn't used the role can explicitly be set to standalone.
If the server instance is exclusively served through nginx with the devpi-lockdown plugin, the request is redirected to the login form due to missing user information. There is no known exploit in this case.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "devpi-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.20.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54723"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-304"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-18T20:41:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nIf the replication protocol is enabled by using the ``primary`` (or deprecated ``master``) role for a server instance, then the ``+changelog`` URL route can be used to read the complete database content including password hashes, and the ids and salts of tokens from ``devpi-tokens`` by using a trivially modified GET request.\n\nThe leaked hashes use the ``argon2`` algorithm, so they are not immediately at risk by brute-force methods, but dictionary attacks are feasible. If a database leak could have happened, it is advised to change the passwords after a patched version or other mitigation is in place.\n\nWhen ``devpi-tokens`` is in use, the quality of the server secret is important. It might be possible to derive the server secret if actual tokens are public by using similar techniques to finding the password for a hash. If a database leak could have happened and any tokens are public, it is advised to change the server secret.\n\nBesides the information leak this can be used to produce significant CPU, IO and bandwidth usage depending on the database size.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe logic bug causing this issue is fixed with devpi-server 6.20.2 and devpi-server 7.0.0b3.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nWhen replication isn\u0027t used the role can explicitly be set to ``standalone``.\n\nIf the server instance is exclusively served through ``nginx`` with the ``devpi-lockdown`` plugin, the request is redirected to the login form due to missing user information. There is no known exploit in this case.",
"id": "GHSA-m5pq-69xg-vcq3",
"modified": "2026-08-18T20:41:22Z",
"published": "2026-08-18T20:41:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/devpi/devpi/security/advisories/GHSA-m5pq-69xg-vcq3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/devpi/devpi"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "devpi-server may leak database contents"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.