GHSA-M55P-FCX3-2QRQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/page-writeback: avoid 32-bit overflow in dirty threshold shares

The ratios used by __wb_calc_thresh() are scaled to parts per million, but the threshold and ratio operands are unsigned long. On 32-bit kernels, their multiplication can wrap before the result is assigned to u64.

For example, with a threshold of 25600 pages and the default maximum ratio of 1000000, wb_max_thresh becomes 4125 pages instead of 25600. The shared threshold and minimum share calculations can overflow in the same way, producing incorrect per-writeback dirty limits.

Use a u64 threshold for the three ratio multiplications and div_u64() to retain the existing division order and rounding.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99704"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:06Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/page-writeback: avoid 32-bit overflow in dirty threshold shares\n\nThe ratios used by __wb_calc_thresh() are scaled to parts per million, but\nthe threshold and ratio operands are unsigned long.  On 32-bit kernels,\ntheir multiplication can wrap before the result is assigned to u64.\n\nFor example, with a threshold of 25600 pages and the default maximum ratio\nof 1000000, wb_max_thresh becomes 4125 pages instead of 25600.  The shared\nthreshold and minimum share calculations can overflow in the same way,\nproducing incorrect per-writeback dirty limits.\n\nUse a u64 threshold for the three ratio multiplications and div_u64() to\nretain the existing division order and rounding.",
  "id": "GHSA-m55p-fcx3-2qrq",
  "modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:08Z",
  "published": "2026-11-20T06:32:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99704"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45a2f3102660845d4992ae20587e9afe7c613485"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/64783904ec5eb7240c9e035122367294757311ed"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9597c2056e05bd79df9d343a9b42e84a54de1c52"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d342881c5bb75460ae28cfd2006e21dbf9aec443"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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