GHSA-M4JG-4GFW-GM5R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: dw-edma: Terminate all descriptors without callbacks
The DMA Engine client documentation says in the "Terminate APIs" section of Documentation/driver-api/dmaengine/client.rst:
"No callback functions will be called for any incomplete transfers."
dw-edma instead calls vchan_cookie_complete() when a deferred STOP reaches the interrupt handler. This schedules a callback for the active descriptor and leaves other issued or submitted descriptors queued. A late callback after dmaengine_terminate_sync() can dereference client state that has already been freed, while leftover descriptors may later restart into reused buffers or leak.
Move all issued and submitted descriptors to the terminated list whenever termination completes. For a pending STOP, do this from both the DONE and ABORT paths. Complete their cookies in order without scheduling callbacks.
A STOP can remain pending until the running transfer raises an interrupt. Make device_synchronize() wait for such a pending STOP to complete before releasing terminated descriptors. Reuse it from free_chan_resources(), then release the remaining virt-dma resources. Sleep instead of busy-polling while waiting, and warn if the existing timeout expires.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93042"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:57Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndmaengine: dw-edma: Terminate all descriptors without callbacks\n\nThe DMA Engine client documentation says in the \"Terminate APIs\" section\nof Documentation/driver-api/dmaengine/client.rst:\n\n\"No callback functions will be called for any incomplete transfers.\"\n\ndw-edma instead calls vchan_cookie_complete() when a deferred STOP reaches\nthe interrupt handler. This schedules a callback for the active descriptor\nand leaves other issued or submitted descriptors queued. A late callback\nafter dmaengine_terminate_sync() can dereference client state that has\nalready been freed, while leftover descriptors may later restart into\nreused buffers or leak.\n\nMove all issued and submitted descriptors to the terminated list whenever\ntermination completes. For a pending STOP, do this from both the DONE and\nABORT paths. Complete their cookies in order without scheduling callbacks.\n\nA STOP can remain pending until the running transfer raises an\ninterrupt. Make device_synchronize() wait for such a pending STOP to\ncomplete before releasing terminated descriptors. Reuse it from\nfree_chan_resources(), then release the remaining virt-dma resources.\nSleep instead of busy-polling while waiting, and warn if the existing\ntimeout expires.",
"id": "GHSA-m4jg-4gfw-gm5r",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:39Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93042"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4793f9099a1cadf4e37f3a03d524af6bce88a0ea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65e387b95d3855aa894ac729e1778e5bcb9083cb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99109a51efd28c9a661fbfb9469b023c517b31d1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be87d86537de7ea6fd025f41033d2faff880973f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da56839aced48ecb70033962d7ea98f55b0c5656"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3ec6702a1d216be61f692cc0a983d6c8fb5ebf7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.