GHSA-M452-Q8C9-RG2F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-26 14:35 – Updated: 2026-08-26 14:35
VLAI
Summary
AsyncHttpClient stores cookie for an unrelated domain (cookie tossing) via ThreadSafeCookieStore
Details

Impact

A cookie tossing / cookie injection issue (CWE-1275). ThreadSafeCookieStore stored a cookie under the value of its Domain attribute without verifying that the responding host is allowed to set a cookie for that domain (RFC 6265 §5.3 step 6). A host the client connects to can therefore plant a cookie scoped to an unrelated domain, and the client will then send that cookie on later requests to that domain.

Who is Impacted

Applications that use a single AsyncHttpClient instance - and thus the default, shared CookieStore - to reach both an attacker-influenced host and a trusted host. Typical exposure: crawlers, link-preview / webhook fetchers, SSRF-style "fetch this URL" features, multi-backend aggregators, or following redirects to an attacker-controlled host. The attacker can write a cookie the client presents to the victim host (session fixation, overwriting a session id / CSRF-token cookie); they cannot read the victim host's cookies. Applications that talk only to a fixed trusted backend, or that disable/scope the cookie store, are not exposed.

Patches

Fixed in 3.0.11 and 2.16.0

Workarounds

  • Disable the cookie store (setCookieStore(null)) when cookies are not needed; or
  • Use a separate AsyncHttpClient (separate cookie store) per trust domain so an attacker-influenced host and a trusted host never share a jar
  • Supply a custom CookieStore whose add(Uri, Cookie) rejects cookies whose Domain is not domain-matched by the request host.
Severity
4.0 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0.Beta1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.16.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55688"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1275"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-26T14:35:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-01T20:17:11Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n A **cookie tossing / cookie injection** issue (CWE-1275). `ThreadSafeCookieStore` stored a cookie under the value of its `Domain` attribute without verifying that the responding host is allowed to set a cookie for that domain (RFC 6265 \u00a75.3 step 6). A host the client connects to can therefore plant a cookie scoped to an unrelated domain, and the client will then send that cookie on later requests to that domain.\n\n### Who is Impacted\nApplications that use a single `AsyncHttpClient` instance - and thus the default, shared `CookieStore` - to reach **both** an attacker-influenced host and a trusted host. Typical exposure: crawlers, link-preview / webhook fetchers, SSRF-style \"fetch this URL\" features, multi-backend aggregators, or following redirects to an attacker-controlled host. The attacker can *write* a cookie the client presents to the victim host (session fixation, overwriting a session id / CSRF-token cookie); they cannot *read* the victim host\u0027s cookies. Applications that talk only to a fixed trusted backend, or that disable/scope the cookie store, are not exposed.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in 3.0.11 and 2.16.0\n\n### Workarounds\n- Disable the cookie store (setCookieStore(null)) when cookies are not needed; or\n- Use a separate AsyncHttpClient (separate cookie store) per trust domain so an attacker-influenced host and a trusted host never share a jar\n- Supply a custom CookieStore whose add(Uri, Cookie) rejects cookies whose Domain is not domain-matched by the request host.",
  "id": "GHSA-m452-q8c9-rg2f",
  "modified": "2026-08-26T14:35:52Z",
  "published": "2026-08-26T14:35:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/security/advisories/GHSA-m452-q8c9-rg2f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55688"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/pull/2196"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/pull/2199"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/commit/8e4069cf3c92abe099db5fb13378ac2fe9e1fd3b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/commit/e6955c1e3951cf80e286981d064f6c926ce33f47"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/releases/tag/async-http-client-project-2.16.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/releases/tag/async-http-client-project-3.0.11"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2026/08/msg00011.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AsyncHttpClient stores cookie for an unrelated domain (cookie tossing) via ThreadSafeCookieStore"
}



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