GHSA-M367-5QFC-GHVX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix soft lockup polling continuation IOCB signature
qla27xx_copy_multiple_pkt() and qla27xx_copy_fpin_pkt() poll rsp_q->ring_ptr->signature for RESPONSE_PROCESSED (0xDEADDEAD) to decide whether the next continuation IOCB has arrived, spinning on cpu_relax() without advancing the ring or decrementing the entry count while it has not. response_t::signature lives at byte offset 60, but a continuation IOCB (sts_cont_entry_t / struct sts_cont_entry_ext) carries raw FC frame payload at that offset (data[56..59]). A received frame whose payload bytes happen to equal 0xDEADDEAD is therefore misread as "not yet arrived", and the loop spins forever in interrupt/DPC context, causing a CPU soft lockup.
The poll is also unnecessary: callers of qla27xx_copy_multiple_pkt() (PT_LS4_UNSOL and the NVMe purls path) already gate on qla_chk_cont_iocb_avail(), which guarantees all entry_count IOCBs are present before copying begins. The sibling helper __qla_copy_purex_to_buffer() already drops the signature poll and relies on the entry_type == STATUS_CONT_TYPE guard instead.
Remove the signature busy-wait from both helpers, keeping the entry_type guard, and gate the FPIN path with qla_chk_cont_iocb_avail() so it defers and re-processes on the next interrupt once all continuation IOCBs have arrived, mirroring the ELS_AUTH_ELS and PT_LS4_UNSOL arms. With this the signature field is never read on a continuation IOCB, eliminating the payload-aliasing lockup.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97530"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:03Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla2xxx: Fix soft lockup polling continuation IOCB signature\n\nqla27xx_copy_multiple_pkt() and qla27xx_copy_fpin_pkt() poll\nrsp_q-\u003ering_ptr-\u003esignature for RESPONSE_PROCESSED (0xDEADDEAD) to decide\nwhether the next continuation IOCB has arrived, spinning on cpu_relax()\nwithout advancing the ring or decrementing the entry count while it has\nnot. response_t::signature lives at byte offset 60, but a continuation\nIOCB (sts_cont_entry_t / struct sts_cont_entry_ext) carries raw FC frame\npayload at that offset (data[56..59]). A received frame whose payload\nbytes happen to equal 0xDEADDEAD is therefore misread as \"not yet\narrived\", and the loop spins forever in interrupt/DPC context, causing a\nCPU soft lockup.\n\nThe poll is also unnecessary: callers of qla27xx_copy_multiple_pkt()\n(PT_LS4_UNSOL and the NVMe purls path) already gate on\nqla_chk_cont_iocb_avail(), which guarantees all entry_count IOCBs are\npresent before copying begins. The sibling helper\n__qla_copy_purex_to_buffer() already drops the signature poll and relies\non the entry_type == STATUS_CONT_TYPE guard instead.\n\nRemove the signature busy-wait from both helpers, keeping the entry_type\nguard, and gate the FPIN path with qla_chk_cont_iocb_avail() so it defers\nand re-processes on the next interrupt once all continuation IOCBs have\narrived, mirroring the ELS_AUTH_ELS and PT_LS4_UNSOL arms. With this the\nsignature field is never read on a continuation IOCB, eliminating the\npayload-aliasing lockup.",
"id": "GHSA-m367-5qfc-ghvx",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:46Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97530"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e58eb888ebf265af937f636d05997c60d2f197c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/428e244dd4066abd40ca1ec525b7aab9a9db8296"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6aa722fca9d2aa1f64094101587f8f4a2f83f6aa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e6c2ba9022eb8f9b062c81bdc6fd24c7b4c4c16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70df7f03499046da0d28a58ec8b237ed5dfbd0a7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bded2de273c5b0e50e3e23de937260436cd67df2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7e3fa7d06bf7fcaac186d3c4d635caac166d36c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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