GHSA-M2XV-M32C-QQV9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: mm: validate /dev/mem mmap ranges without overflow
An arm64 syzkaller reproducer creates a FUSE character device with major:minor 1:1, so opening it uses the /dev/mem file operations. It maps one page from offset 0xfffffffffffff000 at user address zero. The next openat() with a NULL pathname triggers a synchronous external abort (SEA, ESR 0x96000010) in strncpy_from_user() via do_getname(), panicking the kernel.
valid_mmap_phys_addr_range() checks the exclusive end by adding the mapping size to the starting address. For this offset, the sum wraps to zero and passes the PHYS_MASK test, allowing an out-of-range PFN to reach remap_pfn_range(). The inclusive-end overflow check in mmap_mem_prepare() does not catch it because the end is ULONG_MAX.
Reject starting PFNs outside PHYS_MASK and compare the inclusive length against the remaining physical range without overflowing. This also allows mappings that end exactly at PHYS_MASK, which the old check incorrectly rejects.
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: changed the check to look more like __access_ok()]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99617"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:17:54Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\narm64: mm: validate /dev/mem mmap ranges without overflow\n\nAn arm64 syzkaller reproducer creates a FUSE character device with\nmajor:minor 1:1, so opening it uses the /dev/mem file operations. It\nmaps one page from offset 0xfffffffffffff000 at user address zero.\nThe next openat() with a NULL pathname triggers a synchronous external\nabort (SEA, ESR 0x96000010) in strncpy_from_user() via do_getname(),\npanicking the kernel.\n\nvalid_mmap_phys_addr_range() checks the exclusive end by adding the\nmapping size to the starting address. For this offset, the sum wraps\nto zero and passes the PHYS_MASK test, allowing an out-of-range PFN to\nreach remap_pfn_range(). The inclusive-end overflow check in\nmmap_mem_prepare() does not catch it because the end is ULONG_MAX.\n\nReject starting PFNs outside PHYS_MASK and compare the inclusive length\nagainst the remaining physical range without overflowing. This also\nallows mappings that end exactly at PHYS_MASK, which the old check\nincorrectly rejects.\n\n[catalin.marinas@arm.com: changed the check to look more like __access_ok()]",
"id": "GHSA-m2xv-m32c-qqv9",
"modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:04Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T06:32:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99617"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0958b1397fb5ffdb995c0ccc74349841929c08d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9a54fc8147f45020badd9001d4ed234c74b9526"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db6607fd74263ead8df644b98ff25fac74d86f0e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fddf55af2d078f4186c5ab4f07383c8599b14640"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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