GHSA-M2WP-4MQG-4392

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-06 12:30 – Updated: 2026-11-06 12:30
VLAI
Details

The Pubjet | پاب‌جت plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 5.4.8. This is due to the checkToken() AJAX handler — registered under wp_ajax_pubjet-check-token — performing no capability check and no nonce verification before unconditionally writing the attacker-supplied token GET parameter directly into the site-wide pubjet_settings option via pubjet_update_setting(), prior to any remote validation. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to overwrite the plugin's stored REST API credential with an attacker-chosen value, immediately elevating their effective privileges to those of an authorized Pubjet API client and enabling them to invoke otherwise-restricted endpoints — createReportage, updateReportage, deleteReportage, toggleCopyright, and createBacklink — to create, modify, and delete arbitrary reportage posts and manipulate plugin state that Subscribers cannot normally access. The privilege escalation is self-reinforcing: because RestApi::isTokenValid() authenticates solely by comparing the incoming Authorization header against the value returned by pubjet_token(), which reads from the same option the unprotected handler writes to, the attacker-planted token is trusted as legitimate on all subsequent requests.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-103479"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-06T12:17:15Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Pubjet | \u067e\u0627\u0628\u200c\u062c\u062a plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 5.4.8. This is due to the `checkToken()` AJAX handler \u2014 registered under `wp_ajax_pubjet-check-token` \u2014 performing no capability check and no nonce verification before unconditionally writing the attacker-supplied `token` GET parameter directly into the site-wide `pubjet_settings` option via `pubjet_update_setting()`, prior to any remote validation. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to overwrite the plugin\u0027s stored REST API credential with an attacker-chosen value, immediately elevating their effective privileges to those of an authorized Pubjet API client and enabling them to invoke otherwise-restricted endpoints \u2014 `createReportage`, `updateReportage`, `deleteReportage`, `toggleCopyright`, and `createBacklink` \u2014 to create, modify, and delete arbitrary reportage posts and manipulate plugin state that Subscribers cannot normally access. The privilege escalation is self-reinforcing: because `RestApi::isTokenValid()` authenticates solely by comparing the incoming `Authorization` header against the value returned by `pubjet_token()`, which reads from the same option the unprotected handler writes to, the attacker-planted token is trusted as legitimate on all subsequent requests.",
  "id": "GHSA-m2wp-4mqg-4392",
  "modified": "2026-11-06T12:30:46Z",
  "published": "2026-11-06T12:30:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-103479"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/pubjet/tags/5.4.8/includes/Ajax.php#L26"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/pubjet/tags/5.4.8/includes/Ajax.php#L631"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/pubjet/tags/5.4.8/includes/Ajax.php#L643"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/pubjet/tags/5.4.8/includes/RestApi.php#L363"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/pubjet/tags/5.4.8/includes/RestApi.php#L374"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/0391145a-2707-4639-80d0-a8a98512ef66?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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