GHSA-M2GQ-X88Q-682F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-10-03 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate ACE size against SID sub-authorities
set_ntacl_dacl() validates sid.num_subauth before copying an ACE, but does not verify that the declared ACE size contains all sub-authorities described by that field. An undersized ACE can therefore be copied and later make the POSIX ACL deduplication walk inspect data beyond the copied ACE boundary.
The existing initial bound check is also too small. It only ensures that the ACE size field is accessible before set_ntacl_dacl() reads sid.num_subauth farther into the input buffer.
Require enough input for the fixed SID header before accessing num_subauth, reject ACEs smaller than that header, and skip ACEs whose declared size cannot contain the complete SID. This makes the validation consistent with the other ACE walk paths.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68097"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:19:54Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: validate ACE size against SID sub-authorities\n\nset_ntacl_dacl() validates sid.num_subauth before copying an ACE, but\ndoes not verify that the declared ACE size contains all sub-authorities\ndescribed by that field. An undersized ACE can therefore be copied\nand later make the POSIX ACL deduplication walk inspect data beyond\nthe copied ACE boundary.\n\nThe existing initial bound check is also too small. It only ensures\nthat the ACE size field is accessible before set_ntacl_dacl() reads\nsid.num_subauth farther into the input buffer.\n\nRequire enough input for the fixed SID header before accessing\nnum_subauth, reject ACEs smaller than that header, and skip ACEs\nwhose declared size cannot contain the complete SID. This makes the\nvalidation consistent with the other ACE walk paths.",
"id": "GHSA-m2gq-x88q-682f",
"modified": "2026-10-03T12:31:01Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68097"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/337022d9dfac441c3b35e4455a51aa981996e02e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5152c6d49e3fd4e9f2e857c57527aead752f1f87"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a2d9fe0e87c71baa0aaa1cfc1361892fcd1ece0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61fd3559199f7fa693dcbff35e59477e24af041a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62d80d7c2d9428085e7458ad4c06ca8c0984039b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7cb5bf0855470799f12da825de91e48951b3876"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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