GHSA-M284-85MF-CGRC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-13 16:31 – Updated: 2023-09-13 16:31Summary
Field level permissions not being respected in relationship title. If I have a relationship title and the relationship shows a field I don't have permission to see I will still be visible.
Details
No RBAC checks on on the relationship the relation endpoint returns
PoC
Setup
Create a fresh strapi instance Create a new content type in the newly created content type add a relation to the users-permissions user. Save. Create a users-permissions user Use your created content type and create an entry in it related to the users-permisisons user
Go to settings -> Admin panel -> Roles -> Author Give the author role full permissions on the content type your created. Make sure they don't have any permission to see User Save
Create a new admin account with only the author role
CVE
login on the newly created author acount. go to the content manager to the colection type you created with the relationship to users_permissions_user You now see a field you don't have permissions to view.
Impact
RBAC field level checks leaks data selected by the admin user as relationship title What could be sensitive fields that they should not be allowed to see. by the person having this specific role.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@strapi/plugin-content-manager"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.12.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-37263"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-09-13T16:31:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-15T19:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nField level permissions not being respected in relationship title.\nIf I have a relationship title and the relationship shows a field I don\u0027t have permission to see I will still be visible.\n\n### Details\nNo RBAC checks on on the relationship the relation endpoint returns\n\n### PoC\n#### Setup\nCreate a fresh strapi instance\nCreate a new content type\nin the newly created content type add a relation to the users-permissions user.\nSave.\nCreate a users-permissions user\nUse your created content type and create an entry in it related to the users-permisisons user\n\nGo to settings -\u003e Admin panel -\u003e Roles -\u003e Author\nGive the author role full permissions on the content type your created.\nMake sure they don\u0027t have any permission to see User\nSave\n\nCreate a new admin account with only the author role\n#### CVE\nlogin on the newly created author acount.\ngo to the content manager to the colection type you created with the relationship to users_permissions_user\nYou now see a field you don\u0027t have permissions to view.\n\n### Impact\nRBAC field level checks leaks data selected by the admin user as relationship title\nWhat could be sensitive fields that they should not be allowed to see. by the person having this specific role.",
"id": "GHSA-m284-85mf-cgrc",
"modified": "2023-09-13T16:31:43Z",
"published": "2023-09-13T16:31:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/security/advisories/GHSA-m284-85mf-cgrc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37263"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/releases/tag/v4.12.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Strapi\u0027s field level permissions not being respected in relationship title"
}
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