GHSA-M224-9CFF-885M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-18 15:30 – Updated: 2025-12-11 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: fix multipath crash caused by flush request when blktrace is enabled
The flush request initialized by blk_kick_flush has NULL bio, and it may be dealt with nvme_end_req during io completion. When blktrace is enabled, nvme_trace_bio_complete with multipath activated trying to access NULL pointer bio from flush request results in the following crash:
[ 2517.831677] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001a [ 2517.835213] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 2517.838724] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 2517.842222] PGD 7b2d51067 P4D 0 [ 2517.845684] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 2517.849125] CPU: 2 PID: 732 Comm: kworker/2:1H Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S 5.15.67-0.cl9.x86_64 #1 [ 2517.852723] Hardware name: XFUSION 2288H V6/BC13MBSBC, BIOS 1.13 07/27/2022 [ 2517.856358] Workqueue: nvme_tcp_wq nvme_tcp_io_work [nvme_tcp] [ 2517.859993] RIP: 0010:blk_add_trace_bio_complete+0x6/0x30 [ 2517.863628] Code: 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 46 08 31 c9 ba 04 00 10 00 48 8b 80 50 03 00 00 48 8b 78 50 e9 e5 fe ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 49 89 f4 55 <0f> b6 7a 1a 48 89 d5 e8 3e 1c 2b 00 48 89 ee 4c 89 e7 5d 89 c1 ba [ 2517.871269] RSP: 0018:ff7f6a008d9dbcd0 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 2517.875081] RAX: ff3d5b4be00b1d50 RBX: 0000000002040002 RCX: ff3d5b0a270f2000 [ 2517.878966] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ff3d5b0b021fb9f8 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 2517.882849] RBP: ff3d5b0b96a6fa00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2517.886718] R10: 000000000000000c R11: 000000000000000c R12: ff3d5b0b021fb9f8 [ 2517.890575] R13: 0000000002000000 R14: ff3d5b0b021fb1b0 R15: 0000000000000018 [ 2517.894434] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff3d5b42bfc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2517.898299] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2517.902157] CR2: 000000000000001a CR3: 00000004f023e005 CR4: 0000000000771ee0 [ 2517.906053] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2517.909930] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 2517.913761] PKRU: 55555554 [ 2517.917558] Call Trace: [ 2517.921294] [ 2517.924982] nvme_complete_rq+0x1c3/0x1e0 [nvme_core] [ 2517.928715] nvme_tcp_recv_pdu+0x4d7/0x540 [nvme_tcp] [ 2517.932442] nvme_tcp_recv_skb+0x4f/0x240 [nvme_tcp] [ 2517.936137] ? nvme_tcp_recv_pdu+0x540/0x540 [nvme_tcp] [ 2517.939830] tcp_read_sock+0x9c/0x260 [ 2517.943486] nvme_tcp_try_recv+0x65/0xa0 [nvme_tcp] [ 2517.947173] nvme_tcp_io_work+0x64/0x90 [nvme_tcp] [ 2517.950834] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x390 [ 2517.954473] worker_thread+0x53/0x3c0 [ 2517.958069] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390 [ 2517.961655] kthread+0x10c/0x130 [ 2517.965211] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 [ 2517.968760] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 2517.972285]
To avoid this situation, add a NULL check for req->bio before calling trace_block_bio_complete.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-50388"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-18T14:15:37Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvme: fix multipath crash caused by flush request when blktrace is enabled\n\nThe flush request initialized by blk_kick_flush has NULL bio,\nand it may be dealt with nvme_end_req during io completion.\nWhen blktrace is enabled, nvme_trace_bio_complete with multipath\nactivated trying to access NULL pointer bio from flush request\nresults in the following crash:\n\n[ 2517.831677] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001a\n[ 2517.835213] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n[ 2517.838724] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n[ 2517.842222] PGD 7b2d51067 P4D 0\n[ 2517.845684] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n[ 2517.849125] CPU: 2 PID: 732 Comm: kworker/2:1H Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S 5.15.67-0.cl9.x86_64 #1\n[ 2517.852723] Hardware name: XFUSION 2288H V6/BC13MBSBC, BIOS 1.13 07/27/2022\n[ 2517.856358] Workqueue: nvme_tcp_wq nvme_tcp_io_work [nvme_tcp]\n[ 2517.859993] RIP: 0010:blk_add_trace_bio_complete+0x6/0x30\n[ 2517.863628] Code: 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 46 08 31 c9 ba 04 00 10 00 48 8b 80 50 03 00 00 48 8b 78 50 e9 e5 fe ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 49 89 f4 55 \u003c0f\u003e b6 7a 1a 48 89 d5 e8 3e 1c 2b 00 48 89 ee 4c 89 e7 5d 89 c1 ba\n[ 2517.871269] RSP: 0018:ff7f6a008d9dbcd0 EFLAGS: 00010286\n[ 2517.875081] RAX: ff3d5b4be00b1d50 RBX: 0000000002040002 RCX: ff3d5b0a270f2000\n[ 2517.878966] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ff3d5b0b021fb9f8 RDI: 0000000000000000\n[ 2517.882849] RBP: ff3d5b0b96a6fa00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000\n[ 2517.886718] R10: 000000000000000c R11: 000000000000000c R12: ff3d5b0b021fb9f8\n[ 2517.890575] R13: 0000000002000000 R14: ff3d5b0b021fb1b0 R15: 0000000000000018\n[ 2517.894434] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff3d5b42bfc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[ 2517.898299] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[ 2517.902157] CR2: 000000000000001a CR3: 00000004f023e005 CR4: 0000000000771ee0\n[ 2517.906053] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\n[ 2517.909930] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\n[ 2517.913761] PKRU: 55555554\n[ 2517.917558] Call Trace:\n[ 2517.921294] \u003cTASK\u003e\n[ 2517.924982] nvme_complete_rq+0x1c3/0x1e0 [nvme_core]\n[ 2517.928715] nvme_tcp_recv_pdu+0x4d7/0x540 [nvme_tcp]\n[ 2517.932442] nvme_tcp_recv_skb+0x4f/0x240 [nvme_tcp]\n[ 2517.936137] ? nvme_tcp_recv_pdu+0x540/0x540 [nvme_tcp]\n[ 2517.939830] tcp_read_sock+0x9c/0x260\n[ 2517.943486] nvme_tcp_try_recv+0x65/0xa0 [nvme_tcp]\n[ 2517.947173] nvme_tcp_io_work+0x64/0x90 [nvme_tcp]\n[ 2517.950834] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x390\n[ 2517.954473] worker_thread+0x53/0x3c0\n[ 2517.958069] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390\n[ 2517.961655] kthread+0x10c/0x130\n[ 2517.965211] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40\n[ 2517.968760] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30\n[ 2517.972285] \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nTo avoid this situation, add a NULL check for req-\u003ebio before\ncalling trace_block_bio_complete.",
"id": "GHSA-m224-9cff-885m",
"modified": "2025-12-11T21:31:26Z",
"published": "2025-09-18T15:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-50388"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/183c2aaef40a91acbaae45c3824d6cde7bb62b10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3659fb5ac29a5e6102bebe494ac789fd47fb78f4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4df413d46960f11c8c105238cfc3f5ff4c95c003"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f13301a69ababa6c2236fb4f0393b7e914e7e1e0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fcd2d199486033223e9b2a6a7f9a01dd0327eac3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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