GHSA-JXCH-924P-FPFW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-20 12:30 – Updated: 2026-05-12 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpu: Re-enable CPU mitigations by default for !X86 architectures
Rename x86's to CPU_MITIGATIONS, define it in generic code, and force it on for all architectures exception x86. A recent commit to turn mitigations off by default if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n kinda sorta missed that "cpu_mitigations" is completely generic, whereas SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is x86-specific.
Rename x86's SPECULATIVE_MITIGATIONS instead of keeping both and have it select CPU_MITIGATIONS, as having two configs for the same thing is unnecessary and confusing. This will also allow x86 to use the knob to manage mitigations that aren't strictly related to speculative execution.
Use another Kconfig to communicate to common code that CPU_MITIGATIONS is already defined instead of having x86's menu depend on the common CPU_MITIGATIONS. This allows keeping a single point of contact for all of x86's mitigations, and it's not clear that other architectures want to allow disabling mitigations at compile-time.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-35996"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-20T10:15:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncpu: Re-enable CPU mitigations by default for !X86 architectures\n\nRename x86\u0027s to CPU_MITIGATIONS, define it in generic code, and force it\non for all architectures exception x86. A recent commit to turn\nmitigations off by default if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n kinda sorta\nmissed that \"cpu_mitigations\" is completely generic, whereas\nSPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is x86-specific.\n\nRename x86\u0027s SPECULATIVE_MITIGATIONS instead of keeping both and have it\nselect CPU_MITIGATIONS, as having two configs for the same thing is\nunnecessary and confusing. This will also allow x86 to use the knob to\nmanage mitigations that aren\u0027t strictly related to speculative\nexecution.\n\nUse another Kconfig to communicate to common code that CPU_MITIGATIONS\nis already defined instead of having x86\u0027s menu depend on the common\nCPU_MITIGATIONS. This allows keeping a single point of contact for all\nof x86\u0027s mitigations, and it\u0027s not clear that other architectures *want*\nto allow disabling mitigations at compile-time.",
"id": "GHSA-jxch-924p-fpfw",
"modified": "2026-05-12T12:31:51Z",
"published": "2024-05-20T12:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35996"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-265688.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-613116.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36b32816fbab267611f073223f1b0b816ec5920f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/38f17d1fbb5bfb56ca1419e2d06376d57a9396f9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8292f4f8dd1b005d0688d726261004f816ef730a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af6d6a923b40bf6471e44067ac61cc5814b48e7f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd8547ebc187037cc69441a15c1441aeaab80f49"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe42754b94a42d08cf9501790afc25c4f6a5f631"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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