GHSA-JWV5-8MQV-G387
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-15 19:46 – Updated: 2024-05-20 22:06Summary
Due to the improper URL protocols filtering of links specified in the link.argocd.argoproj.io annotations in the application summary component, an attacker can achieve cross-site scripting with elevated permissions.
Impact
All unpatched versions of Argo CD starting with v1.0.0 are vulnerable to a cross-site scripting (XSS) bug allowing a malicious user to inject a javascript: link in the UI. When clicked by a victim user, the script will execute with the victim's permissions (up to and including admin).
This vulnerability allows an attacker to perform arbitrary actions on behalf of the victim via the API, such as creating, modifying, and deleting Kubernetes resources.
Patches
A patch for this vulnerability has been released in the following Argo CD versions:
- v2.10.3
- v2.9.8
- v2.8.12
Workarounds
There are no completely-safe workarounds besides upgrading. The safest alternative, if upgrading is not possible, would be to create a Kubernetes admission controller to reject any resources with an annotation starting with link.argocd.argoproj.io or reject the resource if the value use an improper URL protocol. This validation will need to be applied in all clusters managed by ArgoCD.
Mitigations
- Avoid clicking external links presented in the UI. The link's title is user-configurable. So even if you hover the link, and the tooltip looks safe, the link might be malicious. The only way to be certain that the link is safe is to inspect the page's source.
- Carefully limit who has permissions to edit Kubernetes resource manifests (this is configured in RBAC for ArgoCD). The external-links are set as annotations on Kubernetes resources. Any persona with write access to resources managed by ArgoCD could be an actor.
References
Documentation for the external links feature
Credits
Disclosed by RyotaK (@Ry0taK)
For more information
- Open an issue in the Argo CD issue tracker or discussions
- Join us on Slack in channel #argo-cd
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.8.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.9.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.9.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.10.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.10.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-28175"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-03-15T19:46:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-13T21:16:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nDue to the improper URL protocols filtering of links specified in the `link.argocd.argoproj.io` annotations in the application summary component, an attacker can achieve cross-site scripting with elevated permissions.\n\n### Impact\n\nAll unpatched versions of Argo CD starting with v1.0.0 are vulnerable to a cross-site scripting (XSS) bug allowing a malicious user to inject a javascript: link in the UI. When clicked by a victim user, the script will execute with the victim\u0027s permissions (up to and including admin).\n\nThis vulnerability allows an attacker to perform arbitrary actions on behalf of the victim via the API, such as creating, modifying, and deleting Kubernetes resources.\n\n### Patches\nA patch for this vulnerability has been released in the following Argo CD versions:\n\n* v2.10.3\n* v2.9.8\n* v2.8.12\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no completely-safe workarounds besides **upgrading**. The safest alternative, if upgrading is not possible, would be to create a [Kubernetes admission controller](https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/extensible-admission-controllers/) to reject any resources with an annotation starting with `link.argocd.argoproj.io` or reject the resource if the value use an improper URL protocol. This validation will need to be applied in all clusters managed by ArgoCD.\n\n#### Mitigations\n\n1. Avoid clicking external links presented in the UI.\nThe link\u0027s title is user-configurable. So even if you hover the link, and the tooltip looks safe, the link might be malicious. The only way to be certain that the link is safe is to inspect the page\u0027s source.\n2. Carefully limit who has permissions to edit Kubernetes resource manifests (this is configured in [RBAC](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/rbac/) for ArgoCD). \nThe external-links are set as annotations on Kubernetes resources. Any persona with write access to resources managed by ArgoCD could be an actor.\n\n### References\n[Documentation for the external links feature](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/user-guide/external-url/)\n\n### Credits\n\nDisclosed by [RyotaK](https://ryotak.net) (@Ry0taK)\n\n### For more information\n\n- Open an issue in [the Argo CD issue tracker](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+sort%3Aupdated-desc) or [discussions](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/discussions)\n- Join us on [Slack](https://argoproj.github.io/community/join-slack) in channel #argo-cd",
"id": "GHSA-jwv5-8mqv-g387",
"modified": "2024-05-20T22:06:33Z",
"published": "2024-03-15T19:46:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/security/advisories/GHSA-jwv5-8mqv-g387"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-28175"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/479b5544b57dc9ef767d49f7003f39602c480b71"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Cross-site scripting on application summary component"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.