GHSA-JWP5-C35F-QV38
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-01 18:30 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:34In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: gso: fix ownership in __udp_gso_segment
In __udp_gso_segment the skb destructor is removed before segmenting the skb but the socket reference is kept as-is. This is an issue if the original skb is later orphaned as we can hit the following bug:
kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3312! (skb_orphan) RIP: 0010:ip_rcv_core+0x8b2/0xca0 Call Trace: ip_rcv+0xab/0x6e0 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x168/0x1b0 process_backlog+0x384/0x1100 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa1/0x370 net_rx_action+0x925/0xe50
The above can happen following a sequence of events when using OpenVSwitch, when an OVS_ACTION_ATTR_USERSPACE action precedes an OVS_ACTION_ATTR_OUTPUT action:
- OVS_ACTION_ATTR_USERSPACE is handled (in do_execute_actions): the skb goes through queue_gso_packets and then __udp_gso_segment, where its destructor is removed.
- The segments' data are copied and sent to userspace.
- OVS_ACTION_ATTR_OUTPUT is handled (in do_execute_actions) and the same original skb is sent to its path.
- If it later hits skb_orphan, we hit the bug.
Fix this by also removing the reference to the socket in __udp_gso_segment.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-21926"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-01T16:15:23Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: gso: fix ownership in __udp_gso_segment\n\nIn __udp_gso_segment the skb destructor is removed before segmenting the\nskb but the socket reference is kept as-is. This is an issue if the\noriginal skb is later orphaned as we can hit the following bug:\n\n kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3312! (skb_orphan)\n RIP: 0010:ip_rcv_core+0x8b2/0xca0\n Call Trace:\n ip_rcv+0xab/0x6e0\n __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x168/0x1b0\n process_backlog+0x384/0x1100\n __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa1/0x370\n net_rx_action+0x925/0xe50\n\nThe above can happen following a sequence of events when using\nOpenVSwitch, when an OVS_ACTION_ATTR_USERSPACE action precedes an\nOVS_ACTION_ATTR_OUTPUT action:\n\n1. OVS_ACTION_ATTR_USERSPACE is handled (in do_execute_actions): the skb\n goes through queue_gso_packets and then __udp_gso_segment, where its\n destructor is removed.\n2. The segments\u0027 data are copied and sent to userspace.\n3. OVS_ACTION_ATTR_OUTPUT is handled (in do_execute_actions) and the\n same original skb is sent to its path.\n4. If it later hits skb_orphan, we hit the bug.\n\nFix this by also removing the reference to the socket in\n__udp_gso_segment.",
"id": "GHSA-jwp5-c35f-qv38",
"modified": "2026-10-15T03:34:45Z",
"published": "2025-04-01T18:30:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21926"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-457936.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01a83237644d6822bc7df2c5564fc81b0df84358"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/084819b0d8b1bd433b90142371eb9450d657f8ca"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/455217ac9db0cf9349b3933664355e907bb1a569"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f28205ddb76e86cac418332e952241d85fed0dc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2d1cca955ed34873e524cc2e6e885450d262f05"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c32da44cc9298eaa6109e3fc2c2b4e07cc4bf11b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8db70537878e1bb3fd83e5abcc6feefc0587828"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee01b2f2d7d0010787c2343463965bbc283a497f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/05/msg00030.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/05/msg00045.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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