GHSA-JVVM-VVMF-JF3R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-17 09:31 – Updated: 2026-11-17 09:31
VLAI
Details

Issue summary: When an application passes a stack to PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() to add entries to, and reading fails, OpenSSL frees every entry in the stack, both the old ones and any new ones, but leaves them in the stack.

Impact summary: An application that passes an existing stack to PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() and keeps using it after a failed read may use memory that was already freed. This can cause a crash or, in principle, memory corruption. Malformed PEM data can make the read fail, but only applications that pass an existing stack are affected, and OpenSSL itself does not do this.

CWE: CWE-416: Use After Free

Description: PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() reads certificates, CRLs and private keys from PEM data and adds them to a stack of X509_INFO structures. If the application passes a stack that is not NULL, the function adds the new entries to it and must leave the entries that are already there unchanged.

If reading fails, the function frees every entry in the stack. This includes the entries that were there before the call, and the entries added by the call. It does not remove these entries from the stack, so the stack keeps pointers to freed memory. The failure can happen at any point, even before any entry was added. A PEM item with invalid content is enough. This also happens if the stack was empty: entries added before the failure are freed but stay in the stack.

An application that then reads or frees the stack will use memory that was already freed. This can crash the application or, in principle, corrupt memory.

Only applications that pass a stack that is not NULL are affected. OpenSSL itself never does this. Its own callers, including the code that TLS uses to load CA certificates, always pass NULL. When the stack is NULL, the function frees only the entries that it created itself, which is safe. We expect that very few applications pass an existing stack. An attacker can make the read fail with malformed PEM data, but cannot make an application pass an existing stack.

The same problem affects PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(), PEM_X509_INFO_read() and PEM_X509_INFO_read_ex(), which use the same code. OpenSSL 1.1.1 and 1.0.2 have only the first two of these functions.

FIPS impact: no The affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-107493"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-416"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-17T09:17:25Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "Issue summary: When an application passes a stack to\nPEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() to add entries to, and reading fails,\nOpenSSL frees every entry in the stack, both the old ones and any new\nones, but leaves them in the stack.\n\nImpact summary: An application that passes an existing stack to\nPEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() and keeps using it after a failed read may\nuse memory that was already freed. This can cause a crash or, in\nprinciple, memory corruption. Malformed PEM data can make the read fail,\nbut only applications that pass an existing stack are affected, and\nOpenSSL itself does not do this.\n\nCWE: CWE-416: Use After Free\n\nDescription: PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() reads certificates, CRLs and\nprivate keys from PEM data and adds them to a stack of X509_INFO\nstructures. If the application passes a stack that is not NULL, the\nfunction adds the new entries to it and must leave the entries that are\nalready there unchanged.\n\nIf reading fails, the function frees every entry in the stack. This\nincludes the entries that were there before the call, and the entries\nadded by the call. It does not remove these entries from the stack, so\nthe stack keeps pointers to freed memory. The failure can happen at any\npoint, even before any entry was added. A PEM item with invalid content\nis enough.  This also happens if the stack was empty: entries added\nbefore the failure are freed but stay in the stack.\n\nAn application that then reads or frees the stack will use memory that\nwas already freed. This can crash the application or, in principle,\ncorrupt memory.\n\nOnly applications that pass a stack that is not NULL are affected.\nOpenSSL itself never does this. Its own callers, including the code that\nTLS uses to load CA certificates, always pass NULL. When the stack is\nNULL, the function frees only the entries that it created itself, which\nis safe. We expect that very few applications pass an existing stack. An\nattacker can make the read fail with malformed PEM data, but cannot make\nan application pass an existing stack.\n\nThe same problem affects PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(), PEM_X509_INFO_read()\nand PEM_X509_INFO_read_ex(), which use the same code. OpenSSL 1.1.1 and\n1.0.2 have only the first two of these functions.\n\nFIPS impact: no\nThe affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary.",
  "id": "GHSA-jvvm-vvmf-jf3r",
  "modified": "2026-11-17T09:31:44Z",
  "published": "2026-11-17T09:31:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107493"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/0486dfadfec558e1808f59d35a8d79e541c4e7d7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/c57a5ccf0c060755b5494a6870922b7c6cdd7dd8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/c8f6d04f8e6d40b1bf83334e4a2ec9daf5943a3d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20261117.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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