GHSA-JV6X-X2JH-JFMR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 09:31
VLAI
Details

The Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass via PHP Type Juggling in all versions up to, and including, 28.2. This is due to the postValidateCustomer() function using a loose PHP inequality operator (!=) to compare the session-stored one-time verification code against the attacker-supplied verification_code parameter — a flaw that is further exposed by the booking AJAX controller registering all its methods as wp_ajax_nopriv_ handlers and unconditionally overriding csrfTokenValid() to return true, leaving the endpoint both unauthenticated and CSRF-unprotected. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass the phone/email ownership verification step and overwrite the name, email, phone, and address fields of any arbitrary existing Bookly customer record, redirecting that customer's booking notifications to attacker-controlled contact details. The bypass is achievable because the json_data input channel decodes input via json_decode(), which preserves real PHP types and causes the wp_kses filter to leave non-string values such as the JSON boolean true untouched; submitting true as the verification_code satisfies the loose comparison against the session's non-zero integer code (generated by mt_rand(100000, 999999)), causing true != <non-zero int> to evaluate as false and the guard to be bypassed.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-92799"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T07:16:55Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System \u2013 Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass via PHP Type Juggling in all versions up to, and including, 28.2. This is due to the `postValidateCustomer()` function using a loose PHP inequality operator (`!=`) to compare the session-stored one-time verification code against the attacker-supplied `verification_code` parameter \u2014 a flaw that is further exposed by the booking AJAX controller registering all its methods as `wp_ajax_nopriv_` handlers and unconditionally overriding `csrfTokenValid()` to return true, leaving the endpoint both unauthenticated and CSRF-unprotected. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass the phone/email ownership verification step and overwrite the name, email, phone, and address fields of any arbitrary existing Bookly customer record, redirecting that customer\u0027s booking notifications to attacker-controlled contact details. The bypass is achievable because the `json_data` input channel decodes input via `json_decode()`, which preserves real PHP types and causes the `wp_kses` filter to leave non-string values such as the JSON boolean `true` untouched; submitting `true` as the `verification_code` satisfies the loose comparison against the session\u0027s non-zero integer code (generated by `mt_rand(100000, 999999)`), causing `true != \u003cnon-zero int\u003e` to evaluate as `false` and the guard to be bypassed.",
  "id": "GHSA-jv6x-x2jh-jfmr",
  "modified": "2026-09-25T09:31:06Z",
  "published": "2026-09-25T09:31:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92799"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/28.2/frontend/modules/booking/Ajax.php#L1447"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/28.2/frontend/modules/booking/Ajax.php#L15"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/28.2/frontend/modules/booking/Ajax.php#L785"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/28.2/frontend/modules/booking/Ajax.php#L903"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/28.2/lib/UserBookingData.php#L638"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/28.2/lib/Validator.php#L276"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/28.2/lib/base/Component.php#L182"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3707284%40bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool\u0026new=3707284%40bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d24fa600-7698-4081-92f5-e11606928886?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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