GHSA-JRPM-956J-96JG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-15 20:01 – Updated: 2026-09-15 20:01Summary
Ember's chunk decoder parses the size token leniently: it strips leading and trailing whitespace and accepts a leading + or - sign. RFC9112 §7.1 defines chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG. An intermediary that parses the chunk boundary differently (or rejects it) will disagree with Ember on request framing, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.TE).
Impact
Server
Request smuggling (TE.TE) when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that forwards the body verbatim but interprets the malformed chunk sizes differently
- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary might have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers.
- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy.
- Request queue hijack:
Client
ember-client has the same leniencies on the response path, which enables response smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway. This is less severe, as it requires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote client.
Preconditions
- Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)
- ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary
- Malicious or compromised upstream (client)
- Intermediary or upstream forwards chunked bodies without re-encoding and disagrees with Ember on
+prefix,-prefix, or leading and trailing octets rather than rejecting.
Workarounds
- Intermediary strictly rejects malformed chunk sizes
- Intermediary buffers and re-encodes request bodies
References
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.23.34"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.35"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.23.34"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.35"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.23.34"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.35"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0-M46"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0-M1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-M47"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0-M46"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0-M1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-M47"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-69216"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-444"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-15T20:01:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nEmber\u0027s chunk decoder parses the size token leniently: it strips leading and trailing whitespace and accepts a leading `+` or `-` sign. RFC9112 \u00a77.1 defines `chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG`. An intermediary that parses the chunk boundary differently (or rejects it) will disagree with Ember on request framing, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.TE).\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling (TE.TE) when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that forwards the body verbatim but interprets the malformed chunk sizes differently\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary might have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy.\n- Request queue hijack:\n\n### Client\n\nember-client has the same leniencies on the response path, which enables response smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway. This is less severe, as it requires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote client.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)\n- ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary\n- Malicious or compromised upstream (client)\n- Intermediary or upstream forwards chunked bodies without re-encoding and disagrees with Ember on `+` prefix, `-` prefix, or leading and trailing octets rather than rejecting.\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Intermediary strictly rejects malformed chunk sizes\n- Intermediary buffers and re-encodes request bodies\n\n## References\n\n- [RFC9112 \u00a77.1: Chunked Transfer Coding](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9112.html#name-chunked-transfer-coding)",
"id": "GHSA-jrpm-956j-96jg",
"modified": "2026-09-15T20:01:00Z",
"published": "2026-09-15T20:01:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s/security/advisories/GHSA-jrpm-956j-96jg"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s/commit/d78612a5abd5a2547487598d3342be05573e16f0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s/releases/tag/v0.23.35"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s/releases/tag/v1.0.0-M47"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Http4s: Ember chunk parser lenience (TE.TE request smuggling)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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