GHSA-JR45-8VMC-QM54
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 19:32 – Updated: 2026-08-03 19:32Impact
Undici's cache interceptor mishandles optional whitespace (OWS) placed around the = of a qualified no-cache or private Cache-Control directive, such as no-cache ="authorization" (OWS before =) or no-cache= "authorization" (OWS after =). The parser either drops the directive entirely or stores a field name with literal quote characters, so the downstream cache decisions do not recognize the qualification and the response is stored.
In shared-cache mode, this allows a response containing one user's authenticated data to be served from cache to a subsequent caller, including an unauthenticated caller, when both requests resolve to the same cache key. The impact class is identical to CVE-2026-9678 (GHSA-pr7r-676h-xcf6); this advisory covers the whitespace-around-= bypass that the earlier fix did not normalize.
Affected applications are those that explicitly enable the cache interceptor (interceptors.cache()) in shared mode, forward Authorization headers upstream, and receive cacheable responses with qualified private or no-cache directives whose field-name list is padded with OWS around the =.
Patches
Upgrade to undici v7.29.0 or v8.9.0.
Workarounds
If upgrade is not immediately possible, disable shared-cache mode for traffic that includes Authorization headers, avoid caching responses to authenticated requests, or add Vary: Authorization upstream.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "undici"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.29.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "undici"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-14643"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-436",
"CWE-524"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-03T19:32:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-29T22:16:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nUndici\u0027s cache interceptor mishandles optional whitespace (OWS) placed around the `=` of a qualified `no-cache` or `private` Cache-Control directive, such as `no-cache =\"authorization\"` (OWS before `=`) or `no-cache= \"authorization\"` (OWS after `=`). The parser either drops the directive entirely or stores a field name with literal quote characters, so the downstream cache decisions do not recognize the qualification and the response is stored.\n\nIn shared-cache mode, this allows a response containing one user\u0027s authenticated data to be served from cache to a subsequent caller, including an unauthenticated caller, when both requests resolve to the same cache key. The impact class is identical to CVE-2026-9678 (GHSA-pr7r-676h-xcf6); this advisory covers the whitespace-around-`=` bypass that the earlier fix did not normalize.\n\nAffected applications are those that explicitly enable the cache interceptor (`interceptors.cache()`) in shared mode, forward `Authorization` headers upstream, and receive cacheable responses with qualified `private` or `no-cache` directives whose field-name list is padded with OWS around the `=`.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici v7.29.0 or v8.9.0.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrade is not immediately possible, disable shared-cache mode for traffic that includes `Authorization` headers, avoid caching responses to authenticated requests, or add `Vary: Authorization` upstream.",
"id": "GHSA-jr45-8vmc-qm54",
"modified": "2026-08-03T19:32:12Z",
"published": "2026-08-03T19:32:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-jr45-8vmc-qm54"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14643"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/85a240551c9feb8b8a0ecc56c84b2b3015add8a9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/cb105d7c79069150982fa11acada0dd94a60dbbc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v7.29.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v8.9.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "undici vulnerable to cross-user information disclosure via whitespace around equals in Cache-Control directives"
}
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