GHSA-JQXW-MH4H-WM57
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: extend IPv6 exthdr detection of tunneled packets
Commit c4336a07eb6b ("net: correctly handle tunneled traffic on IPV6_CSUM GSO fallback") split skb_gso_has_extension_hdr() into mutually exclusive branches on skb->encapsulation. This did not yet address all paths:
-
With skb->encapsulation set, the outer header is not checked. IPv6 tunnels such as ip6_gre and ip6_tunnel add an outer Destination Options header by default (encap_limit). Their GSO packets skip software GSO, then skb_csum_hwoffload_help() sees the outer extension header and calls skb_checksum_help() on the GSO skb, which warns and drops it.
-
Tunnels over IPv6 without an outer transport header, such as ip6_tunnel, leave skb->transport_header at the inner transport header. skb_network_header_len() then spans the outer IPv6, tunnel and inner IP headers, a false positive.
-
UDP tunnels without an inner network header, such as SCTP-in-UDP or PSP, have no inner IPv6 header to check. Decide on the outer header alone.
-
Directly dereferencing inner_ip_hdr(skb)->version without skb_header_pointer() is unsafe.
Instead, check ipv6_ext_hdr(nexthdr) on the outer IPv6 header and, if set, on the inner IPv6 header. Read the headers with skb_header_pointer(). Keep the skb_network_header_len() check when !skb->encapsulation to also catch encapsulated packets without skb->encapsulation (e.g., virtio).
Use the same helper in skb_csum_hwoffload_help(). Its open coded test has the false positive of (2) and ignores the inner header.
Background: checksum offload of tunneled packets invariants:
Non-GSO skb: - If the inner packet is CHECKSUM_PARTIAL, Local Checksum Offload computes the outer checksum in software and the device offloads only the inner L4 checksum. - If the inner packet is CHECKSUM_NONE (e.g., SCTP-in-UDP, ESP-in-UDP, Remote Checksum Offload), the device offloads the outer UDP or GRE checksum instead.
GSO skb: - A device with NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL_CSUM or NETIF_F_GSO_GRE_CSUM computes both inner and outer checksums per segment. The outer checksum is seeded with only the pseudo-header checksum.
A NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM device must parse through the outer headers to reach the inner ones.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98852"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:39Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: extend IPv6 exthdr detection of tunneled packets\n\nCommit c4336a07eb6b (\"net: correctly handle tunneled traffic on IPV6_CSUM\nGSO fallback\") split skb_gso_has_extension_hdr() into mutually exclusive\nbranches on skb-\u003eencapsulation. This did not yet address all paths:\n\n1. With skb-\u003eencapsulation set, the outer header is not checked. IPv6\n tunnels such as ip6_gre and ip6_tunnel add an outer Destination\n Options header by default (encap_limit). Their GSO packets skip\n software GSO, then skb_csum_hwoffload_help() sees the outer extension\n header and calls skb_checksum_help() on the GSO skb, which warns and\n drops it.\n\n2. Tunnels over IPv6 without an outer transport header, such as\n ip6_tunnel, leave skb-\u003etransport_header at the inner transport\n header. skb_network_header_len() then spans the outer IPv6, tunnel\n and inner IP headers, a false positive.\n\n3. UDP tunnels without an inner network header, such as SCTP-in-UDP or\n PSP, have no inner IPv6 header to check. Decide on the outer header\n alone.\n\n4. Directly dereferencing inner_ip_hdr(skb)-\u003eversion without\n skb_header_pointer() is unsafe.\n\nInstead, check ipv6_ext_hdr(nexthdr) on the outer IPv6 header and, if\nset, on the inner IPv6 header. Read the headers with skb_header_pointer().\nKeep the skb_network_header_len() check when !skb-\u003eencapsulation to also\ncatch encapsulated packets without skb-\u003eencapsulation (e.g., virtio).\n\nUse the same helper in skb_csum_hwoffload_help(). Its open coded test\nhas the false positive of (2) and ignores the inner header.\n\nBackground: checksum offload of tunneled packets invariants:\n\nNon-GSO skb:\n- If the inner packet is CHECKSUM_PARTIAL, Local Checksum Offload computes\n the outer checksum in software and the device offloads only the inner L4\n checksum.\n- If the inner packet is CHECKSUM_NONE (e.g., SCTP-in-UDP, ESP-in-UDP,\n Remote Checksum Offload), the device offloads the outer UDP or GRE\n checksum instead.\n\nGSO skb:\n- A device with NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL_CSUM or NETIF_F_GSO_GRE_CSUM\n computes both inner and outer checksums per segment.\n The outer checksum is seeded with only the pseudo-header checksum.\n\nA NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM device must parse through the outer headers to\nreach the inner ones.",
"id": "GHSA-jqxw-mh4h-wm57",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:32:06Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:32:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98852"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44ba9dc568c878b699d05e7cf699572dc9df4b59"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f0764cb1c81a9712bce605d38efe6d844a70b29"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa480f05aed7a9eee87d4a6fc90647fe9679c670"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cabacdf98e09eb74599c4d97d7bd7fd659598fb7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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