GHSA-JQWQ-P3W6-JFFX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Validate the SVE vector length in pkvm_vcpu_init_sve()
pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() clamps only the upper bound of the host-provided sve_max_vl, so an invalid vector length reaches sve_state_size_from_vl() and the WARN_ON() there, which is fatal at EL2. The existing !sve_state_size test rejects such a length, but only after the macro has run.
Check sve_vl_valid() before deriving the state size. A valid length cannot yield a zero size, so the !sve_state_size test goes with it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98638"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:16Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: arm64: Validate the SVE vector length in pkvm_vcpu_init_sve()\n\npkvm_vcpu_init_sve() clamps only the upper bound of the host-provided\nsve_max_vl, so an invalid vector length reaches sve_state_size_from_vl()\nand the WARN_ON() there, which is fatal at EL2. The existing\n!sve_state_size test rejects such a length, but only after the macro has\nrun.\n\nCheck sve_vl_valid() before deriving the state size. A valid length\ncannot yield a zero size, so the !sve_state_size test goes with it.",
"id": "GHSA-jqwq-p3w6-jffx",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:31:57Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:31:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98638"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a2eb10795a1e495aebc7f829ccecb72c05b4fd9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bae3e4493046de4fefa15f809d9b8dc114e84a3d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/faf66e55e87498ab4bf88cdf9a629e61b3f2d3bc"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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