GHSA-JQVF-J3WW-R8C7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 18:37 – Updated: 2026-08-28 18:37
VLAI
Summary
PowSyBl Core has Command Injection in LocalCommandExecutor-s
Details

Impact

Description

Both AbstractLocalCommandExecutor OS-dependent implementations are subject to CWE-78 (OS Command Injection), with a secondary CWE-88 (Argument Injection) concern via environment variables.

The local command executor build command strings via concatenation and executes them (through bash -c for Unix, or cmd /c for Windows). Any string argument or environment variable value reaching this executor can break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary shell code as the JVM user.

The sink is reachable through public APIs that accept List<String> arguments without any documented indication that elements undergo shell interpretation.

Any caller — CLI, library integration, or embedding service — that forwards data from a less-trusted source into these APIs inherits the vulnerability.

Vulnerable elements

The vulnerable elements are: - Public methods: - UnixLocalCommandExecutor.execute(...) - WindowsLocalCommandExecutor.execute(...) - LocalComputationManager.execute(...) - ParallelLoadFlowActionSimulator.run(...) - ActionSimulatorTool.run(...) - AmplModelRunner.run(...) - AmplModelRunner.runAsync(...) - itools commands: - action-simulator, when the task-count option is defined - security-analysis, when the external option is defined - dynamic-security-analysis

Characteristics

The vulnerability characteristics are the following: - It allows arbitrary shell command execution as the JVM user (read, write, execute any file; spawn processes; exfiltrate data; etc.) - There are multiple independent injection vectors within a single vulnerable call: - args elements (weakly escaped — bypassable via $(...), backticks, escaped quotes) - Environment variable values (unescaped — bypassable via ;, \n, or shell metacharacters) - It is silent from the caller's perspective: the List<String> API gives no indication that shell interpretation occurs. - It exposes downstream projects: any service embedding powsybl-core (REST front-ends, pypowsybl tooling, multi-tenant grid analysis platforms) that exposes contingency IDs or computation parameters to external input is exploitable without needing to touch powsybl's code directly.

Am I impacted?

You are vulnerable if you make direct calls to one of the vulnerable end-user methods or itools commands listed in the "Vulnerable elements" section, with user-provided parameters, without controlling them.

Patches

com.powsybl:powsybl-computation-local:7.2.2 and higher

Workarounds

If you cannot update your powsybl-computation-local version, you can check the content of the user-provided arguments when calling the vulnerable methods, by forbidding (if possible) the following characters: - On Unix/Linux systems: - \, !, #, $, ^, &, *, (, ), {, }, |, [, ], \, ;, \, ", ,, <, >, ?, - On Windows: - %, !, ", \n, \r, ^

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.2.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.powsybl:powsybl-computation-local"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55673"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T18:37:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n#### Description\nBoth `AbstractLocalCommandExecutor` OS-dependent implementations are subject to **CWE-78** (OS Command Injection), with a secondary **CWE-88** (Argument Injection) concern via environment variables.\n\nThe local command executor build command strings via concatenation and executes them (through `bash -c` for Unix, or `cmd /c` for Windows). Any string argument or environment variable value reaching this executor can break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary shell code as the JVM user.\n\nThe sink is reachable through public APIs that accept `List\u003cString\u003e` arguments without any documented indication that elements undergo shell interpretation.\n\nAny caller \u2014 CLI, library integration, or embedding service \u2014 that forwards data from a less-trusted source into these APIs inherits the vulnerability.\n\n#### Vulnerable elements\nThe vulnerable elements are:\n- Public methods:\n  - `UnixLocalCommandExecutor.execute(...)`\n  - `WindowsLocalCommandExecutor.execute(...)`\n  - `LocalComputationManager.execute(...)`\n  - `ParallelLoadFlowActionSimulator.run(...)`\n  - `ActionSimulatorTool.run(...)`\n  - `AmplModelRunner.run(...)`\n  - `AmplModelRunner.runAsync(...)`\n- **itools** commands:\n  - `action-simulator`, when the `task-count` option is defined\n  - `security-analysis`, when the `external` option is defined\n  -  `dynamic-security-analysis`\n\n\n#### Characteristics\n\nThe vulnerability characteristics are the following:\n- It allows **arbitrary shell command execution** as the JVM user (read, write, execute any file; spawn processes; exfiltrate data; etc.)\n- There are **multiple independent injection vectors** within a single vulnerable call:\n  - `args` elements (weakly escaped \u2014 bypassable via `$(...)`, backticks, escaped quotes)\n  - Environment variable values (unescaped \u2014 bypassable via `;`, `\\n`, or shell metacharacters)\n- It is **silent** from the caller\u0027s perspective: the `List\u003cString\u003e` API gives no indication that shell interpretation occurs.\n- It exposes **downstream projects:** any service embedding `powsybl-core` (REST front-ends, pypowsybl tooling, multi-tenant grid analysis platforms) that exposes contingency IDs or computation parameters to external input is exploitable without needing to touch powsybl\u0027s code directly.\n\n\n#### Am I impacted?\n\nYou are vulnerable if you make direct calls to one of the vulnerable end-user methods or itools commands listed in the \"Vulnerable elements\" section, with user-provided parameters, without controlling them.\n\n\n### Patches\n\n`com.powsybl:powsybl-computation-local:7.2.2` and higher\n\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot update your `powsybl-computation-local` version, you can check the content of the user-provided arguments when calling the vulnerable methods, by forbidding (if possible) the following characters:\n- On Unix/Linux systems:\n  - `\\`, `!`, `#`, `$`, `^`, `\u0026`, `*`, `(`, `)`, `{`, `}`, `|`, `[`, `]`, `\\`, `;`, `\\`, `\"`, `,`, `\u003c`, `\u003e`, `?`, ` `\n- On Windows:\n  - `%`, `!`, `\"`, `\\n`, `\\r`, `^`",
  "id": "GHSA-jqvf-j3ww-r8c7",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T18:37:28Z",
  "published": "2026-08-28T18:37:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/security/advisories/GHSA-jqvf-j3ww-r8c7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/pull/3973"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/commit/17461264d1d18f9bba43bb7855f251e9fa55a4db"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/commit/7aa28d8c2492bbcd061585cb498acce72d5ed79a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/releases/tag/v7.2.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PowSyBl Core has Command Injection in LocalCommandExecutor-s"
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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