GHSA-JQ6G-4V5M-WM9R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-25 18:25 – Updated: 2023-08-03 17:57CVSS:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N/E:F/RL:O/RC:C(3.5)
Problem
In multi-site scenarios, enumerating the HTTP query parameters id and L allowed out-of-scope access to rendered content in the website frontend. For instance, this allowed visitors to access content of an internal site by adding handcrafted query parameters to the URL of a site that was publicly available.
Solution
Update to TYPO3 versions 9.5.42 ELTS, 10.4.39 ELTS, 11.5.30, 12.4.4 that fix the problem described above.
ℹ️ Strong security defaults - Manual actions required Resolving sites by the
idandLHTTP query parameters is now denied per default. However, it is still allowed to resolve a particular page by e.g.https://example.org/?id=123&L=0- as long as thepage-id 123is in the scope of the site configured for thebase-url example.org. The new feature flagsecurity.frontend.allowInsecureSiteResolutionByQueryParameters- which is disabled per default - can be used to reactivate the previous behavior.
Credits
Thanks to Garvin Hicking who reported this issue, and to TYPO3 core & security team members Oliver Hader and Benjamin Franzke who fixed the issue.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.5.42"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.4.39"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.5.30"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "12.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "12.4.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-38499"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-25T18:25:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-25T21:15:10Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "\u003e ### CVSS: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N/E:F/RL:O/RC:C` (3.5)\n\n### Problem\nIn multi-site scenarios, enumerating the HTTP query parameters `id` and `L` allowed out-of-scope access to rendered content in the website frontend. For instance, this allowed visitors to access content of an internal site by adding handcrafted query parameters to the URL of a site that was publicly available.\n\n### Solution\nUpdate to TYPO3 versions 9.5.42 ELTS, 10.4.39 ELTS, 11.5.30, 12.4.4 that fix the problem described above.\n\n\u003e \u2139\ufe0f **Strong security defaults - Manual actions required**\n\u003e Resolving sites by the `id` and `L` HTTP query parameters is now denied per default. However, it is still allowed to resolve a particular page by e.g. `https://example.org/?id=123\u0026L=0` - as long as the `page-id 123` is in the scope of the site configured for the `base-url example.org`.\n\u003e The new feature flag `security.frontend.allowInsecureSiteResolutionByQueryParameters` - which is disabled per default - can be used to reactivate the previous behavior.\n\n### Credits\nThanks to Garvin Hicking who reported this issue, and to TYPO3 core \u0026 security team members Oliver Hader and Benjamin Franzke who fixed the issue.\n\n### References\n* [TYPO3-CORE-SA-2023-003](https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2023-003)\n",
"id": "GHSA-jq6g-4v5m-wm9r",
"modified": "2023-08-03T17:57:05Z",
"published": "2023-07-25T18:25:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/typo3/security/advisories/GHSA-jq6g-4v5m-wm9r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-38499"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/typo3/commit/702e2debd4b28f9cdb540544565fe6a8627ccb6a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/typo3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2023-003"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Information Disclosure due to Out-of-scope Site Resolution"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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