GHSA-JPVP-FW99-V7CQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: synchronize heartbeat callbacks with o2net teardown
Patch series "ocfs2: harden heartbeat teardown races".
This series fixes two OCFS2 heartbeat/o2net teardown races found by KASAN.
This patch (of 2):
Heartbeat callbacks stay registered while configfs local-node teardown enters o2net_stop_listening(). A node-down event can still run through o2net_disconnect_node() and o2net_set_nn_state() while teardown is destroying o2net_wq, so the later queue/flush operations can hit a dead workqueue. KASAN has caught this as a slab-use-after-free in __queue_work() with the call chain:
KASAN slab-use-after-free in __queue_work+0x56/0xa90 Read of size 4 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xce/0x630 __queue_work+0x56/0xa90 srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __virt_addr_valid+0x19f/0x330 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 __queue_delayed_work+0x58/0x1e0 queue_delayed_work_on+0xb4/0xc0 o2net_set_nn_state+0x467/0x840 o2net_disconnect_node+0x7b/0xe0 o2net_hb_node_down_cb+0x54/0x60 o2hb_run_event_list+0x236/0x2d0 o2hb_check_slot+0xad4/0xbc0 lock_release+0xc8/0x290 o2hb_check_slot+0x9ea/0xbc0 trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130 o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x646/0xb30 (fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c:1079) __lock_acquire+0x466/0x2260 lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 ktime_get_with_offset+0xe9/0x230 o2hb_thread+0x14e/0x770 kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540 __switch_to+0x2e9/0x730 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Allocated by task stack: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 __kmalloc_noprof+0x292/0x760 __alloc_workqueue+0x736/0xc60 alloc_workqueue_noprof+0xb1/0x110 o2net_start_listening+0xe5/0x430 o2nm_node_local_store+0x184/0x310 configfs_write_iter+0x18a/0x210 vfs_write+0x469/0x810 ksys_write+0xd2/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task stack: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 kfree+0x313/0x590 rcu_core+0x4f4/0x1320 handle_softirqs+0x156/0x660
queue_delayed_work_on o2net_set_nn_state o2net_disconnect_node o2net_hb_node_down_cb o2hb_run_event_list
Keep heartbeat callbacks registered so quorum state still tracks node state, but stop them from driving o2net reconnect/disconnect work once local teardown starts. Mark the transport offline before destroying o2net_wq, wait for any in-flight heartbeat callback to finish, and delay bring-up replay until the new local node is published through o2nm_this_node().
The replay also has to stay serialized with heartbeat callback delivery. Otherwise a live-node snapshot can be copied, a real hb_down callback can install -ENOTCONN for a peer, and the stale replay can call o2net_hb_node_up() for that same peer and queue reconnect work even though heartbeat is already down.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order within that path:
local-node teardown: heartbeat node-down callback: 1. configfs local-off enters 1. o2hb_run_event_list() invokes o2net_stop_listening(). o2net_hb_node_down_cb(). 2. teardown heads for 2. the callback reaches destroy_workqueue(o2net_wq). o2net_disconnect_node() and o2net_set_nn_state(). 3. teardown destroys and NULLs 3. the callback flushes or queues o2net_wq. work through o2net_wq.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90302"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:27Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2: synchronize heartbeat callbacks with o2net teardown\n\nPatch series \"ocfs2: harden heartbeat teardown races\".\n\nThis series fixes two OCFS2 heartbeat/o2net teardown races found by\nKASAN.\n\n\nThis patch (of 2):\n\nHeartbeat callbacks stay registered while configfs local-node teardown\nenters o2net_stop_listening(). A node-down event can still run through\no2net_disconnect_node() and o2net_set_nn_state() while teardown is\ndestroying o2net_wq, so the later queue/flush operations can hit a dead\nworkqueue. KASAN has caught this as a slab-use-after-free in\n__queue_work() with the call chain:\n\nKASAN slab-use-after-free in __queue_work+0x56/0xa90\nRead of size 4\nCall trace:\n dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0\n print_report+0xce/0x630\n __queue_work+0x56/0xa90\n srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n __virt_addr_valid+0x19f/0x330\n kasan_report+0xe0/0x110\n __queue_delayed_work+0x58/0x1e0\n queue_delayed_work_on+0xb4/0xc0\n o2net_set_nn_state+0x467/0x840\n o2net_disconnect_node+0x7b/0xe0\n o2net_hb_node_down_cb+0x54/0x60\n o2hb_run_event_list+0x236/0x2d0\n o2hb_check_slot+0xad4/0xbc0\n lock_release+0xc8/0x290\n o2hb_check_slot+0x9ea/0xbc0\n trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130\n o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x646/0xb30 (fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c:1079)\n __lock_acquire+0x466/0x2260\n lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0\n ktime_get_with_offset+0xe9/0x230\n o2hb_thread+0x14e/0x770\n kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0\n ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540\n __switch_to+0x2e9/0x730\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\nAllocated by task stack:\n kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0\n __kmalloc_noprof+0x292/0x760\n __alloc_workqueue+0x736/0xc60\n alloc_workqueue_noprof+0xb1/0x110\n o2net_start_listening+0xe5/0x430\n o2nm_node_local_store+0x184/0x310\n configfs_write_iter+0x18a/0x210\n vfs_write+0x469/0x810\n ksys_write+0xd2/0x170\n do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\nFreed by task stack:\n kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60\n __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80\n kfree+0x313/0x590\n rcu_core+0x4f4/0x1320\n handle_softirqs+0x156/0x660\n\nqueue_delayed_work_on\no2net_set_nn_state\no2net_disconnect_node\no2net_hb_node_down_cb\no2hb_run_event_list\n\nKeep heartbeat callbacks registered so quorum state still tracks node\nstate, but stop them from driving o2net reconnect/disconnect work once\nlocal teardown starts. Mark the transport offline before destroying\no2net_wq, wait for any in-flight heartbeat callback to finish, and delay\nbring-up replay until the new local node is published through\no2nm_this_node().\n\nThe replay also has to stay serialized with heartbeat callback delivery.\nOtherwise a live-node snapshot can be copied, a real hb_down callback\ncan install -ENOTCONN for a peer, and the stale replay can call\no2net_hb_node_up() for that same peer and queue reconnect work even\nthough heartbeat is already down.\n\nThe buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order\nwithin that path:\n\nlocal-node teardown: heartbeat node-down callback:\n1. configfs local-off enters 1. o2hb_run_event_list() invokes\n o2net_stop_listening(). o2net_hb_node_down_cb().\n2. teardown heads for 2. the callback reaches\n destroy_workqueue(o2net_wq). o2net_disconnect_node() and\n o2net_set_nn_state().\n3. teardown destroys and NULLs 3. the callback flushes or queues\n o2net_wq. work through o2net_wq.",
"id": "GHSA-jpvp-fw99-v7cq",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:31:59Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:31:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90302"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/073f51e39bed354452a057d38a4cc3952727c304"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e326f3bf16506873777444608e8b715aab74a7a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7601db4c9d3bd9ab2482a863cb05204154d51ae8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f96b78314cff0778a3466e49e5edbc1e459c95c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a03078a9a2a1c5e4a62f65d389c1f75f9898e21d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aee687a2fb36974dc37e4e0f5b03802067c6c4ec"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cbb4efc2f99d6a8dba09c96b10acad82da982cf9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb61882e184ee5ca745806bc5b2a8483fa129bca"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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