GHSA-JPRQ-4GHP-P3F9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_sync: Protect UUID list traversal

The hci_sync conversion moved class-of-device and EIR generation from an HCI request built under hdev->lock to asynchronous command sync work. The worker holds hdev->req_lock, but that lock does not serialize access to hdev->uuids against add_uuid() and remove_uuid(), which update the list under hdev->lock.

The following interleaving can therefore occur:

CPU0 (command sync work) CPU1 (management socket) fetch uuid from the list list_del(&uuid->list) kfree(uuid) read uuid->size

KASAN reports the resulting use-after-free:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in eir_create+0xb8f/0xee0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810dbd8620 by task kworker/u17:0/87 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: eir_create+0xb8f/0xee0 hci_update_eir_sync+0x1c0/0x330 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x13c/0x290 process_one_work+0x63a/0x1070 worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10

Allocated by task 86: __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 add_uuid+0x18a/0x4b0 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1033/0x1ea0

Freed by task 92: __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70 kfree+0x131/0x3c0 remove_uuid+0x25e/0x560 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1033/0x1ea0

Hold hdev->lock while generating and committing the class-of-device and EIR snapshots. Release it before sending an HCI command, so controller waits do not happen under the device lock. This protects all UUID list walks in these paths and restores the serialization lost in the command sync conversion.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-68189"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-362"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:06Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_sync: Protect UUID list traversal\n\nThe hci_sync conversion moved class-of-device and EIR generation from an\nHCI request built under hdev-\u003elock to asynchronous command sync work.\nThe worker holds hdev-\u003ereq_lock, but that lock does not serialize access\nto hdev-\u003euuids against add_uuid() and remove_uuid(), which update the\nlist under hdev-\u003elock.\n\nThe following interleaving can therefore occur:\n\n  CPU0 (command sync work)       CPU1 (management socket)\n  fetch uuid from the list\n                                list_del(\u0026uuid-\u003elist)\n                                kfree(uuid)\n  read uuid-\u003esize\n\nKASAN reports the resulting use-after-free:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in eir_create+0xb8f/0xee0\n  Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810dbd8620 by task kworker/u17:0/87\n  Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work\n  Call Trace:\n   eir_create+0xb8f/0xee0\n   hci_update_eir_sync+0x1c0/0x330\n   hci_cmd_sync_work+0x13c/0x290\n   process_one_work+0x63a/0x1070\n   worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10\n\n  Allocated by task 86:\n   __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0\n   add_uuid+0x18a/0x4b0\n   hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1033/0x1ea0\n\n  Freed by task 92:\n   __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70\n   kfree+0x131/0x3c0\n   remove_uuid+0x25e/0x560\n   hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1033/0x1ea0\n\nHold hdev-\u003elock while generating and committing the class-of-device and\nEIR snapshots.  Release it before sending an HCI command, so controller\nwaits do not happen under the device lock.  This protects all UUID list\nwalks in these paths and restores the serialization lost in the command\nsync conversion.",
  "id": "GHSA-jprq-4ghp-p3f9",
  "modified": "2026-08-19T18:32:09Z",
  "published": "2026-08-10T15:33:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68189"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/30bc6248f035a792d1b1f4cc761b32fd5827b55f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a351f68fb24828b23a971e00b8238ee0e8a40380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a42f5536ea9c00e13f0c0fbb330feed95e2365ca"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e4fa2c5c261d736b8e58759fdef3a968d510630c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9027ffbf5a0f3c12ca8900822e884eae9f0821b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe13adc258df88d95789e5673c7ba5178b5f8b28"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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