GHSA-JMCW-QGQ2-CH5F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix early procfs exposure race
Currently, init_cifs() calls cifs_proc_init() near the beginning of the function, before INIT_LIST_HEAD, leading to a momentarily uninitialized, but exposed, procfs. If a userspace process reads this empty procfs, iterating over a zeroed list_head leads to a NULL pointer dereference and a kernel oops/panic.
For example, if a delay is added between cifs_proc_init() and INIT_LIST_HEAD, and a userspace process is polling /proc/fs/cifs/DebugData, the following oops occurs:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000608 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3477 Comm: cat Not tainted 7.3.0-02212-g4df4d2a577db-dirty #6 PREEMPT(lazy) RIP: 0010:cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0x103/0xd80 [cifs] Call Trace: ? seq_read_iter+0x86/0x400 ? seq_read_iter+0x86/0x400 seq_read_iter+0x183/0x400 proc_reg_read_iter+0x62/0x90 copy_splice_read+0x215/0x310 splice_file_to_pipe+0xec/0x1c0 do_splice+0x4b8/0x780 __se_sys_splice+0x18f/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x109/0x330 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Fix this by moving cifs_proc_init() down in init_cifs(), ensuring it runs only after all internal lists, locks, counters, and workqueues are fully ready, but before registering the filesystem. Update the error cleanup ladder and exit_cifs() to maintain proper LIFO order.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99548"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:18:11Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix early procfs exposure race\n\nCurrently, init_cifs() calls cifs_proc_init() near the beginning of\nthe function, before INIT_LIST_HEAD, leading to a momentarily\nuninitialized, but exposed, procfs. If a userspace process reads this\nempty procfs, iterating over a zeroed list_head leads to a NULL\npointer dereference and a kernel oops/panic.\n\nFor example, if a delay is added between cifs_proc_init() and\nINIT_LIST_HEAD, and a userspace process is polling\n/proc/fs/cifs/DebugData, the following oops occurs:\n\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000608\nOops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3477 Comm: cat Not tainted\n7.3.0-02212-g4df4d2a577db-dirty #6 PREEMPT(lazy)\nRIP: 0010:cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0x103/0xd80 [cifs]\nCall Trace:\n\u003cTASK\u003e\n ? seq_read_iter+0x86/0x400\n ? seq_read_iter+0x86/0x400\n seq_read_iter+0x183/0x400\n proc_reg_read_iter+0x62/0x90\n copy_splice_read+0x215/0x310\n splice_file_to_pipe+0xec/0x1c0\n do_splice+0x4b8/0x780\n __se_sys_splice+0x18f/0x250\n do_syscall_64+0x109/0x330\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nFix this by moving cifs_proc_init() down in init_cifs(), ensuring it runs\nonly after all internal lists, locks, counters, and workqueues are fully\nready, but before registering the filesystem. Update the error cleanup\nladder and exit_cifs() to maintain proper LIFO order.",
"id": "GHSA-jmcw-qgq2-ch5f",
"modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T15:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99548"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31209411c4f98158b41508b7f90583e8cf5d6076"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d6e1b44d1fbfa70b045a670b18200dc4824226b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b1afb631395c958993cda4631002258ef4151ea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfaec5094017bd9d41a0572325ec2cec4f7d5e31"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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