GHSA-JM5C-RV3W-W83M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-06-29 21:13 – Updated: 2025-01-30 14:38Impact
Denial-of-service (crash) during block processing
Details
Affected versions suffer from a vulnerability which can be exploited through the MULMOD operation, by specifying a modulo of 0: mulmod(a,b,0), causing a panic in the underlying library.
The crash was in the uint256 library, where a buffer underflowed.
if `d == 0`, `dLen` remains `0`
and https://github.com/holiman/uint256/blob/4ce82e695c10ddad57215bdbeafb68b8c5df2c30/uint256.go#L451 will try to access index [-1].
The uint256 library was first merged in this commit, on 2020-06-08.
Exploiting this vulnerabilty would cause all vulnerable nodes to drop off the network.
The issue was brought to our attention through a bug report, showing a panic occurring on sync from genesis on the Ropsten network.
It was estimated that the least obvious way to fix this would be to merge the fix into uint256, make a new release of that library and then update the geth-dependency.
- https://github.com/holiman/uint256/releases/tag/v1.1.1 was made the same day,
- PR to address the issue: https://github.com/holiman/uint256/pull/80
- PR to update geth deps: https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/21368
Patches
Upgrade to v1.9.18 or higher
Workarounds
Not at this time
References
https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in go-ethereum * Email us at security@ethereum.org
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.9.16"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/holiman/uint256"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-26242"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-191",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-21T21:50:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nDenial-of-service (crash) during block processing\n\n### Details\n\nAffected versions suffer from a vulnerability which can be exploited through the `MULMOD` operation, by specifying a modulo of `0`: `mulmod(a,b,0)`, causing a `panic` in the underlying library. \nThe crash was in the `uint256` library, where a buffer [underflowed](https://github.com/holiman/uint256/blob/4ce82e695c10ddad57215bdbeafb68b8c5df2c30/uint256.go#L442).\n\n\tif `d == 0`, `dLen` remains `0`\n\nand https://github.com/holiman/uint256/blob/4ce82e695c10ddad57215bdbeafb68b8c5df2c30/uint256.go#L451 will try to access index `[-1]`.\n\nThe `uint256` library was first merged in this [commit](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/cf6674539c589f80031f3371a71c6a80addbe454), on 2020-06-08. \nExploiting this vulnerabilty would cause all vulnerable nodes to drop off the network. \n\nThe issue was brought to our attention through a [bug report](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/issues/21367), showing a `panic` occurring on sync from genesis on the Ropsten network.\n \nIt was estimated that the least obvious way to fix this would be to merge the fix into `uint256`, make a new release of that library and then update the geth-dependency.\n\n- https://github.com/holiman/uint256/releases/tag/v1.1.1 was made the same day, \n- PR to address the issue: https://github.com/holiman/uint256/pull/80 \n- PR to update geth deps: https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/21368 \n\n\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to v1.9.18 or higher\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNot at this time\n\n### References\n\nhttps://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [go-ethereum](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum)\n* Email us at [security@ethereum.org](mailto:security@ethereum.org)\n",
"id": "GHSA-jm5c-rv3w-w83m",
"modified": "2025-01-30T14:38:53Z",
"published": "2021-06-29T21:13:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-jm5c-rv3w-w83m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26242"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/holiman/uint256/pull/80"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/7163a6664ee664df81b9028ab3ba13b9d65a7196"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/holiman/uint256/commit/6785da6e3eea403260a5760029e722aa4ff1716d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2021-0103"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Denial of service in geth"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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