GHSA-JJ2J-7JRJ-28Q3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-16 12:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: fix use-after-free after a failed durable reconnect

ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd() republishes a detached durable handle in the reconnecting session's file table and takes no reference for that entry. If smb2_open() then fails, cleanup relies on the final ksmbd_fd_put() to remove the volatile id.

Two reconnects of the same handle can both take a lookup reference before either attaches it. If the one that reopens first then fails and drops its references first, the other request makes the final put through ksmbd_put_durable_fd(). That frees the handle without removing the first session's table entry, so tearing that session down writes to freed memory.

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __close_file_table_ids+0x14d/0x740 [ksmbd] Call Trace: __close_file_table_ids+0x14d/0x740 [ksmbd] ksmbd_destroy_file_table+0x76/0x100 [ksmbd] ksmbd_session_destroy+0xf8/0x480 [ksmbd] ksmbd_dispose_sessions+0x13e/0x200 [ksmbd] ksmbd_conn_sessions_cleanup+0x4c3/0x6d0 [ksmbd] Freed by task 1030: __ksmbd_close_fd+0x97d/0x1000 [ksmbd] smb2_open+0x14eb/0xd9f0 [ksmbd]

Commit 3515503322f4 ("ksmbd: fix durable reconnect error path file lifetime") handles a final put made by the reconnecting request, but not one made by another holder.

Remove the volatile id under the file-table lock on this error path, before the references are dropped, as ksmbd_close_fd() does on the request_open path just above. Removal then no longer depends on which holder makes the final put. The stale comment in the reconnect cleanup is updated to match. A successful reconnect is unchanged.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99290"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T10:17:01Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: fix use-after-free after a failed durable reconnect\n\nksmbd_reopen_durable_fd() republishes a detached durable handle in the\nreconnecting session\u0027s file table and takes no reference for that entry.\nIf smb2_open() then fails, cleanup relies on the final ksmbd_fd_put() to\nremove the volatile id.\n\nTwo reconnects of the same handle can both take a lookup reference before\neither attaches it. If the one that reopens first then fails and drops\nits references first, the other request makes the final put through\nksmbd_put_durable_fd(). That frees the handle without removing the first\nsession\u0027s table entry, so tearing that session down writes to freed\nmemory.\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __close_file_table_ids+0x14d/0x740 [ksmbd]\n  Call Trace:\n   __close_file_table_ids+0x14d/0x740 [ksmbd]\n   ksmbd_destroy_file_table+0x76/0x100 [ksmbd]\n   ksmbd_session_destroy+0xf8/0x480 [ksmbd]\n   ksmbd_dispose_sessions+0x13e/0x200 [ksmbd]\n   ksmbd_conn_sessions_cleanup+0x4c3/0x6d0 [ksmbd]\n  Freed by task 1030:\n   __ksmbd_close_fd+0x97d/0x1000 [ksmbd]\n   smb2_open+0x14eb/0xd9f0 [ksmbd]\n\nCommit 3515503322f4 (\"ksmbd: fix durable reconnect error path file\nlifetime\") handles a final put made by the reconnecting request, but not\none made by another holder.\n\nRemove the volatile id under the file-table lock on this error path,\nbefore the references are dropped, as ksmbd_close_fd() does on the\nrequest_open path just above. Removal then no longer depends on which\nholder makes the final put. The stale comment in the reconnect cleanup\nis updated to match. A successful reconnect is unchanged.",
  "id": "GHSA-jj2j-7jrj-28q3",
  "modified": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
  "published": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99290"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/248b5819591c577727930e4e255a455235fab50a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5078a4e41b29acdf6be52e4a7cc8a59c2a72a471"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bd47ee501b6ac4a26ae41f780a43b7967302a269"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edacf65866a9f397438d5b9ff9f43312b29b4b3c"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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