GHSA-JG86-GJJJ-22QV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommufd: Fix wrong hwpt passed to iommufd_auto_response_faults on replace

iommufd_hwpt_replace_device() calls:

iommufd_auto_response_faults(hwpt, old_handle);

passing the new hwpt together with the handle of the device's old domain. This should be a parameter mismatch:

  1. Semantically, iommufd_auto_response_faults(x, handle) scans x->fault's deliver list and response xarray for groups matching "handle". A group is queued under the hwpt that was attached at fault-delivery time. old_handle is fetched before the domain switch, so its group lives on old->fault, not on the new hwpt->fault.

  2. Historically, the first argument was "old". The routine was introduced by commit b7d8833677ba ("iommufd: Fault-capable hwpt attach/detach/replace") as __fault_domain_replace_dev() in fault.c, correctly calling iommufd_auto_response_faults(old, curr). Commit fb21b1568ada ("iommufd: Make attach_handle generic than fault specific") moved this into iommufd_hwpt_replace_device() in device.c and swapped it to "hwpt". This should be a refactor regression, not an intentional change.

Fix this by passing "old" instead.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-80894"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T18:17:57Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommufd: Fix wrong hwpt passed to iommufd_auto_response_faults on replace\n\niommufd_hwpt_replace_device() calls:\n\n\tiommufd_auto_response_faults(hwpt, old_handle);\n\npassing the *new* hwpt together with the handle of\nthe device\u0027s *old* domain. This should be a parameter mismatch:\n\n1. Semantically, iommufd_auto_response_faults(x, handle) scans\n   x-\u003efault\u0027s deliver list and response xarray for groups matching\n   \"handle\". A group is queued under the hwpt that was attached at\n   fault-delivery time. old_handle is fetched *before* the domain switch,\n   so its group lives on old-\u003efault, not on the new hwpt-\u003efault.\n\n2. Historically, the first argument was \"old\". The routine was\n   introduced by commit b7d8833677ba (\"iommufd: Fault-capable hwpt\n   attach/detach/replace\") as __fault_domain_replace_dev() in\n   fault.c, correctly calling iommufd_auto_response_faults(old, curr).\n   Commit fb21b1568ada (\"iommufd: Make attach_handle generic than\n   fault specific\") moved this into iommufd_hwpt_replace_device() in\n   device.c and swapped it to \"hwpt\". This should be a refactor regression,\n   not an intentional change.\n\nFix this by passing \"old\" instead.",
  "id": "GHSA-jg86-gjjj-22qv",
  "modified": "2026-09-04T18:31:33Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T18:31:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80894"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/564ac339c0f8bada4e77a57a92bab9d3df635e07"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8eb077025279304268bd58657f0af3d388822b21"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/adb87155b67f9759ff010c0a99559f5bffa45dcf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba5c0f28a26e7d9be1e0997f8920dd638e2782fd"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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