GHSA-JG26-Q8HG-3PQ4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-23 18:21 – Updated: 2026-09-23 18:21Impact
An unauthenticated JCR-SQL2 injection exists in the Smart Content category filter of the 2.x content query builder.
Category IDs supplied through the public ?categories= query parameter are only trimmed and are then concatenated directly into a JCR-SQL2 WHERE clause, without the numeric validation that the equivalent tag filter already performs. Any public page that renders a Smart Content element with category filtering enabled evaluates this parameter, so no authentication or special configuration beyond a category-filtered content block is required.
An anonymous visitor can therefore:
- inject boolean conditions to infer the existence of, and disclose, content nodes they should not see (for example unpublished pages) via blind boolean-based extraction; and
- submit malformed query fragments that cause query errors or resource-intensive queries, degrading availability.
Because the sink is a JCR-SQL2 query, the impact is limited to reading and enumerating content-repository nodes and to error/denial-of-service conditions; it cannot be used to modify data through this path.
Patches
Fixed in 2.6.25 and 3.0.8. Category, tag, and audience-target-group IDs are now cast to integers before they are used in the JCR-SQL2 query, so no attacker-controlled characters can reach the query.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately:
- Apply the fix manually — cast each ID to an integer where it is concatenated into the category (and, defensively, tag and audience-targeting)
WHEREclause in the content Smart Content query builder. - Alternatively, disable category filtering on publicly reachable Smart Content elements until the patch is applied.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "sulu/sulu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.25"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "sulu/sulu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-92692"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-23T18:21:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated JCR-SQL2 injection exists in the Smart Content category filter of the 2.x content query builder.\n\nCategory IDs supplied through the public `?categories=` query parameter are only trimmed and are then concatenated directly into a JCR-SQL2 `WHERE` clause, without the numeric validation that the equivalent tag filter already performs. Any public page that renders a Smart Content element with category filtering enabled evaluates this parameter, so no authentication or special configuration beyond a category-filtered content block is required.\n\nAn anonymous visitor can therefore:\n\n- inject boolean conditions to infer the existence of, and disclose, content nodes they should not see (for example unpublished pages) via blind boolean-based extraction; and\n- submit malformed query fragments that cause query errors or resource-intensive queries, degrading availability.\n\nBecause the sink is a JCR-SQL2 query, the impact is limited to reading and enumerating content-repository nodes and to error/denial-of-service conditions; it cannot be used to modify data through this path.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **2.6.25 and 3.0.8**. Category, tag, and audience-target-group IDs are now cast to integers before they are used in the JCR-SQL2 query, so no attacker-controlled characters can reach the query.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately:\n\n- Apply the fix manually \u2014 cast each ID to an integer where it is concatenated into the category (and, defensively, tag and audience-targeting) `WHERE` clause in the content Smart Content query builder.\n- Alternatively, disable category filtering on publicly reachable Smart Content elements until the patch is applied.",
"id": "GHSA-jg26-q8hg-3pq4",
"modified": "2026-09-23T18:21:22Z",
"published": "2026-09-23T18:21:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sulu/sulu/security/advisories/GHSA-jg26-q8hg-3pq4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sulu/sulu/commit/d19c01487af8c3de2fb3aa145856707a6367392c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sulu/sulu"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sulu/sulu/releases/tag/2.6.25"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sulu/sulu/releases/tag/3.0.8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Sulu: JCR-SQL2 injection via `categories` query parameter (unauthenticated)"
}
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