GHSA-JF3Q-GP4F-QWVJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-24 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

arm64: hibernate: mask DAIF before restoring hibernated kernel

The arm64 hibernate code manages the exception masking in an unsound way, leading to potential crashes and/or warnings during resume.

When a hibernation image is saved in swsusp_arch_suspend(), all DAIF exceptions are masked (by virtue of local_daif_save()), and the suspended image is saved assuming that all DAIF exceptions will remain masked when the image is restored.

When a hibernation image is resumed by swsusp_arch_resume(), only interrupts are masked (by virtue of local_irq_disable() in resume_target_kernel()). When pseudo-NMI is enabled the DAIF.IF bits will be clear, and regardless of pseudo-NMI the DAIF.DA bits will be clear.

This means that there are two problems:

(1) It is possible to take Debug, SError, or pseudo-NMI exceptions during the resume process. This is unsafe, as during the resume process both the old ane new kernels will tranisently be in an inconsistent state, and swsusp_arch_suspend_exit() won't retain an executable mapping of any exception vectors.

Any exception taken here will be fatal and silent.

(2) When re-entering the resumed kernel, some DAIF bits will be clear unexpectedly. This permits Debug, SError, or pseudo-NMI exceptions to be taken for a short period while the resumed kernel is not yet in a consistent state.

This is detected by CONFIG_ARM64_DEBUG_PRIORITY_MASKING.

Avoid these issues by masking all DAIF exceptions during resume.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-93256"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T16:17:22Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\narm64: hibernate: mask DAIF before restoring hibernated kernel\n\nThe arm64 hibernate code manages the exception masking in an unsound\nway, leading to potential crashes and/or warnings during resume.\n\nWhen a hibernation image is saved in `swsusp_arch_suspend()`, all DAIF\nexceptions are masked (by virtue of `local_daif_save()`), and the\nsuspended image is saved assuming that all DAIF exceptions will remain\nmasked when the image is restored.\n\nWhen a hibernation image is resumed by `swsusp_arch_resume()`, only\ninterrupts are masked (by virtue of `local_irq_disable()` in\n`resume_target_kernel()`). When pseudo-NMI is enabled the DAIF.IF bits\nwill be clear, and regardless of pseudo-NMI the DAIF.DA bits will be\nclear.\n\nThis means that there are two problems:\n\n(1) It is possible to take Debug, SError, or pseudo-NMI exceptions\n    during the resume process. This is unsafe, as during the resume\n    process both the old ane new kernels will tranisently be in an\n    inconsistent state, and swsusp_arch_suspend_exit() won\u0027t retain\n    an executable mapping of any exception vectors.\n\n    Any exception taken here will be fatal and silent.\n\n(2) When re-entering the resumed kernel, some DAIF bits will be clear\n    unexpectedly. This permits Debug, SError, or pseudo-NMI exceptions\n    to be taken for a short period while the resumed kernel is not yet\n    in a consistent state.\n\n    This is detected by CONFIG_ARM64_DEBUG_PRIORITY_MASKING.\n\nAvoid these issues by masking all DAIF exceptions during resume.",
  "id": "GHSA-jf3q-gp4f-qwvj",
  "modified": "2026-09-24T18:31:24Z",
  "published": "2026-09-24T18:31:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93256"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/012823494e20c3cce622982ebd3fd6971be39ad2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/099ad3edcef1d955d9f5d6aab16ae78ecdfd4cda"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/290c5b0c9fc0c61fb1c41421ed2394f955206ea0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5370853041a3cb53a125b77528586278f64b378b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/684bde100117931f4c51c644a95f42f2dab041bc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/716c41bd476334afb943308be9ff2142e34461b7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9c671e9ab87b639720db8f7f8648bdf0f3bc8ec"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d736ace2c491623c9ab5e73744085e93e9ae3ebe"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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