GHSA-J9WJ-M24M-7JJ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-26 22:09 – Updated: 2025-12-01 16:06willitmerge describes itself as a command line tool to check if pull requests are mergeable. There is a Command Injection vulnerability in version willitmerge@0.2.1.
Resources: * Project's GitHub source code: https://github.com/shama/willitmerge/ * Project's npm package: https://www.npmjs.com/package/willitmerge
Background on exploitation
Reporting a Command Injection vulnerability in willitmerge npm package.
A security vulnerability manifests in this package due to the use of insecure child process execution API (exec) to which it concateanes user input, whether provided to the command-line flag, or is in user control in the target repository.
Exploit
POC 1
- Install
willitmerge - Run it with the following command
willitmerge --verbose --remote "https://github.com/lirantal/npq.git; touch /tmp/hel"
- Confirm the file
/tmp/helis created on disk
GitHub-sourced attack vector
Lines 189-197 in lib/willitmerge.js
pass user input controlled by repository collaborators into the git command:
var cmds = [
'git checkout -b ' + branch + ' ' + that.options.remote + '/' + iss.base.ref,
'git remote add ' + branch + ' ' + gitUrl,
'git pull ' + branch + ' ' + iss.head.ref,
'git reset --merge HEAD',
'git checkout ' + origBranch,
'git branch -D ' + branch,
'git remote rm ' + branch
];
Users creating malicious branch names such as ;{echo,hello,world}>/tmp/c
This is a similar attack vector to that which was reported for the [pullit vulnerability (https://security.snyk.io/vuln/npm:pullit:20180214)
Author
Liran Tal
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "willitmerge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-66219"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-26T22:09:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-29T02:15:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "willitmerge describes itself as a command line tool to check if pull requests are mergeable. There is a Command Injection vulnerability in version `willitmerge@0.2.1`.\n\nResources: \n * Project\u0027s GitHub source code: https://github.com/shama/willitmerge/\n * Project\u0027s npm package: https://www.npmjs.com/package/willitmerge\n\n## Background on exploitation\n\nReporting a Command Injection vulnerability in `willitmerge` npm package.\n\nA security vulnerability manifests in this package due to the use of insecure child process execution API (`exec`) to which it concateanes user input, whether provided to the command-line flag, or is in user control in the target repository.\n\n## Exploit \n\n### POC 1\n\n1. Install `willitmerge`\n2. Run it with the following command\n\n```sh\nwillitmerge --verbose --remote \"https://github.com/lirantal/npq.git; touch /tmp/hel\"\n```\n\n3. Confirm the file `/tmp/hel` is created on disk\n\n### GitHub-sourced attack vector\n\n[Lines 189-197](https://github.com/shama/willitmerge/blob/2fe91d05191fb05ac6da685828d109a3a5885028/lib/willitmerge.js#L189-L197) in `lib/willitmerge.js`\npass user input controlled by repository collaborators into the git command:\n\n```js\n var cmds = [\n \u0027git checkout -b \u0027 + branch + \u0027 \u0027 + that.options.remote + \u0027/\u0027 + iss.base.ref,\n \u0027git remote add \u0027 + branch + \u0027 \u0027 + gitUrl,\n \u0027git pull \u0027 + branch + \u0027 \u0027 + iss.head.ref,\n \u0027git reset --merge HEAD\u0027,\n \u0027git checkout \u0027 + origBranch,\n \u0027git branch -D \u0027 + branch,\n \u0027git remote rm \u0027 + branch\n ];\n```\n\nUsers creating malicious branch names such as `;{echo,hello,world}\u003e/tmp/c`\n\nThis is a similar attack vector to that which was reported for the [pullit vulnerability (https://security.snyk.io/vuln/npm:pullit:20180214)\n\n# Author\n\nLiran Tal",
"id": "GHSA-j9wj-m24m-7jj6",
"modified": "2025-12-01T16:06:54Z",
"published": "2025-11-26T22:09:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shama/willitmerge/security/advisories/GHSA-j9wj-m24m-7jj6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66219"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/shama/willitmerge"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shama/willitmerge/blob/2fe91d05191fb05ac6da685828d109a3a5885028/lib/willitmerge.js#L189-L197"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "willitmerge has a Command Injection vulnerability"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.