GHSA-J8XC-7C27-7WJ4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-27 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-27 21:31Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains a SQL injection in its CSV and XLSX import wizard. The wizard reads its update keys with GETPOST('updatekeys', 'array') in htdocs/imports/import.php, which applies only the generic alphanohtml filter: that strips HTML but leaves SQL keywords, comment markers, parentheses, spaces and quotes intact. import_insert() in htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php then iterates the submitted values and builds a filter with $where[] = $key.' = '.$data[$key], having first applied preg_replace('/^.*./i', '', $key), an alias strip that does nothing to a value containing no dot. The assembled string is executed through $this->db->query(). The injected SELECT resolves the row id that the import then assigns to $lastinsertid, which becomes the WHERE target of a subsequent UPDATE, so a UNION SELECT returning an attacker-chosen integer both exfiltrates arbitrary table content and redirects which row the import overwrites; for category link tables the raw filter array is spliced into that UPDATE directly. The interface offers a fixed list of legitimate column codes but the server never checks the submitted values against it. A user holding the import permission can exploit this. Release 23.0.4 does not carry the fix; the allow-list test was added in 24.0.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81728"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-27T20:18:55Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains a SQL injection in its CSV and XLSX import wizard. The wizard reads its update keys with GETPOST(\u0027updatekeys\u0027, \u0027array\u0027) in htdocs/imports/import.php, which applies only the generic alphanohtml filter: that strips HTML but leaves SQL keywords, comment markers, parentheses, spaces and quotes intact. import_insert() in htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php then iterates the submitted values and builds a filter with $where[] = $key.\u0027 = \u0027.$data[$key], having first applied preg_replace(\u0027/^.*\\./i\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $key), an alias strip that does nothing to a value containing no dot. The assembled string is executed through $this-\u003edb-\u003equery(). The injected SELECT resolves the row id that the import then assigns to $lastinsertid, which becomes the WHERE target of a subsequent UPDATE, so a UNION SELECT returning an attacker-chosen integer both exfiltrates arbitrary table content and redirects which row the import overwrites; for category link tables the raw filter array is spliced into that UPDATE directly. The interface offers a fixed list of legitimate column codes but the server never checks the submitted values against it. A user holding the import permission can exploit this. Release 23.0.4 does not carry the fix; the allow-list test was added in 24.0.0.",
"id": "GHSA-j8xc-7c27-7wj4",
"modified": "2026-08-27T21:31:53Z",
"published": "2026-08-27T21:31:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81728"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/commit/24b1b99c89c79a3fe2d1e83b22dc1810cf0fa6e1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/blob/23.0.4/htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php#L925"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dolibarr-before-24.0.0-sql-injection-via-the-csv-and-xlsx-import-update-keys"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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