GHSA-J86X-F498-4JQP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rds: tcp: unregister sysctl before tearing down listen socket
rds_tcp_exit_net() frees the per-netns RDS TCP listen socket via rds_tcp_kill_sock() before unregistering the per-netns sysctl table. Since rds_tcp_skbuf_handler() derives the netns from rtn->rds_tcp_listen_sock->sk, a concurrent sysctl write can race with netns teardown and dereference the freed socket/sk.
KASAN reports the race as:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rds_tcp_skbuf_handler+0x2aa/0x2e0 rds_tcp_skbuf_handler net/rds/tcp.c:721 proc_sys_call_handler fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c vfs_write fs/read_write.c __x64_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c
Fix this by unregistering the RDS TCP sysctl table before calling rds_tcp_kill_sock(). unregister_net_sysctl_table() prevents new sysctl handlers from starting and waits for in-flight handlers to finish, so the listen socket can then be released safely. The fix was tested against the linked reproducer.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68290"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nrds: tcp: unregister sysctl before tearing down listen socket\n\nrds_tcp_exit_net() frees the per-netns RDS TCP listen socket via\nrds_tcp_kill_sock() before unregistering the per-netns sysctl table. Since\nrds_tcp_skbuf_handler() derives the netns from\nrtn-\u003erds_tcp_listen_sock-\u003esk, a concurrent sysctl write can race with\nnetns teardown and dereference the freed socket/sk.\n\nKASAN reports the race as:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rds_tcp_skbuf_handler+0x2aa/0x2e0\n rds_tcp_skbuf_handler net/rds/tcp.c:721\n proc_sys_call_handler fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c\n vfs_write fs/read_write.c\n __x64_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c\n\nFix this by unregistering the RDS TCP sysctl table before calling\nrds_tcp_kill_sock(). unregister_net_sysctl_table() prevents new sysctl\nhandlers from starting and waits for in-flight handlers to finish, so\nthe listen socket can then be released safely. The fix was tested\nagainst the linked reproducer.",
"id": "GHSA-j86x-f498-4jqp",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:00Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68290"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/167e54c703ccd4fa028feb568b0d1002020cff86"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16df2d154ec82e2f7e7585b4fa154751ba37729a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3aa13fe0c1bb7bc5312f878e61523e5d8cf3f85d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66fd678eef1bc2862bde5e7a0f6106256de74f30"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80fffed08dc1c10e971066941d2daa56253f1552"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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