GHSA-J82P-R65H-XX77
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-19 09:34 – Updated: 2025-09-24 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gro: fix ownership transfer
If packets are GROed with fraglist they might be segmented later on and continue their journey in the stack. In skb_segment_list those skbs can be reused as-is. This is an issue as their destructor was removed in skb_gro_receive_list but not the reference to their socket, and then they can't be orphaned. Fix this by also removing the reference to the socket.
For example this could be observed,
kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:3131! (skb_orphan) RIP: 0010:ip6_rcv_core+0x11bc/0x19a0 Call Trace: ipv6_list_rcv+0x250/0x3f0 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x49d/0x8f0 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x634/0xd40 napi_complete_done+0x1d2/0x7d0 gro_cell_poll+0x118/0x1f0
A similar construction is found in skb_gro_receive, apply the same change there.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-35890"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-19T09:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ngro: fix ownership transfer\n\nIf packets are GROed with fraglist they might be segmented later on and\ncontinue their journey in the stack. In skb_segment_list those skbs can\nbe reused as-is. This is an issue as their destructor was removed in\nskb_gro_receive_list but not the reference to their socket, and then\nthey can\u0027t be orphaned. Fix this by also removing the reference to the\nsocket.\n\nFor example this could be observed,\n\n kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:3131! (skb_orphan)\n RIP: 0010:ip6_rcv_core+0x11bc/0x19a0\n Call Trace:\n ipv6_list_rcv+0x250/0x3f0\n __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x49d/0x8f0\n netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x634/0xd40\n napi_complete_done+0x1d2/0x7d0\n gro_cell_poll+0x118/0x1f0\n\nA similar construction is found in skb_gro_receive, apply the same\nchange there.",
"id": "GHSA-j82p-r65h-xx77",
"modified": "2025-09-24T21:30:29Z",
"published": "2024-05-19T09:34:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2eeab8c47c3c0276e0746bc382f405c9a236a5ad"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b3b67f731296027cceb3efad881ae281213f86f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d225b0ac96dc40d7e8ae2bc227eb2c56e130975f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed4cccef64c1d0d5b91e69f7a8a6697c3a865486"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc126c1d51e9552eacd2d717b9ffe9262a8a4cd6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20250509-0008"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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