GHSA-J5HQ-5JCR-XWX7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-20 18:23 – Updated: 2025-04-11 23:13Impact
A vulnerability has been discovered in Steve API (Kubernetes API Translator) in which users can watch resources they are not allowed to access, when they have at least some generic permissions on the type. For example, a user who can get a single secret in a single namespace can get all secrets in every namespace.
During a watch request for a single ID, the following occurs:
- In the case of a watch request for a single resource, Steve API will return a partition with the requested resource in it. In other cases, it will check the user's access when constructing partitions.
- When a watch request for a single resource is issued, instead of using a client which impersonates the user making the request, Steve API will use the admin client, which can read all resources.
This allows any requester to see the contents of any object such as secret keys, signing certificates, API tokens.
Please consult the associated MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Valid Accounts and MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Container and Resource Discovery for further information about this category of attack.
Patches
To address this issue, the fix introduces a change in the behavior of the Steve API.
When issuing a watch request with an ID specified, the requester's permissions are now correctly honoured. This will deny events for objects the requester cannot actually access. Previously these events were returned unconditionally, allowing any requester to see the contents of any object.
Patched versions include the following commits:
| Branch | Commit |
|---|---|
| main | https://github.com/rancher/steve/commit/2175e090fe4b1e603a54e1cdc5148a2b1c11b4d9 |
| release/v2.9 | https://github.com/rancher/steve/commit/6e30359c652333a49e229b2791c9b403d5ef81a9 |
| release/v2.8 | https://github.com/rancher/steve/commit/c744f0b17b88ff5e2fcabc60841174d878ddc88e |
Workarounds
There are no workarounds for this issue. Users are recommended to upgrade, as soon as possible, to a version of Steve API/Rancher Manager which contains the fixes.
References
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security-related inquiries. - Open an issue in the Rancher repository. - Verify with our support matrix and product support lifecycle.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/rancher/steve"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20241029132712-2175e090fe4b"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-52280"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-11-20T18:23:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-11T12:15:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nA vulnerability has been discovered in Steve API (Kubernetes API Translator) in which users can watch resources they are not allowed to access, when they have at least some generic permissions on the type. For example, a user who can get a single secret in a single namespace can get all secrets in every namespace.\n\nDuring a `watch` request for a single ID, the following occurs:\n- In the case of a watch request for a single resource, Steve API will return a partition with the requested resource in it. In other cases, it will check the user\u0027s access when constructing partitions.\n- When a watch request for a single resource is issued, instead of using a client which impersonates the user making the request, Steve API will use the admin client, which can read all resources.\n\nThis allows any requester to see the contents of any object such as secret keys, signing certificates, API tokens.\n\nPlease consult the associated [MITRE ATT\u0026CK - Technique - Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/) and [MITRE ATT\u0026CK - Technique - Container and Resource Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613/) for further information about this category of attack.\n\n### Patches\nTo address this issue, the fix introduces a change in the behavior of the Steve API.\n\nWhen issuing a `watch` request with an ID specified, the requester\u0027s permissions are now correctly honoured. This will deny events for objects the requester cannot actually access. Previously these events were returned unconditionally, allowing any requester to see the contents of any object.\n\nPatched versions include the following commits:\n\n| Branch | Commit |\n| -------- | ------- |\n| main | https://github.com/rancher/steve/commit/2175e090fe4b1e603a54e1cdc5148a2b1c11b4d9 |\n| release/v2.9 | https://github.com/rancher/steve/commit/6e30359c652333a49e229b2791c9b403d5ef81a9 |\n| release/v2.8 | https://github.com/rancher/steve/commit/c744f0b17b88ff5e2fcabc60841174d878ddc88e |\n\n### Workarounds\nThere are no workarounds for this issue. Users are recommended to upgrade, as soon as possible, to a version of Steve API/Rancher Manager which contains the fixes.\n\n### References\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n- Reach out to the [SUSE Rancher Security team](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/policy) for security-related inquiries.\n- Open an issue in the [Rancher](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/issues/new/choose) repository.\n- Verify with our [support matrix](https://www.suse.com/suse-rancher/support-matrix/all-supported-versions/) and [product support lifecycle](https://www.suse.com/lifecycle/).",
"id": "GHSA-j5hq-5jcr-xwx7",
"modified": "2025-04-11T23:13:04Z",
"published": "2024-11-20T18:23:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rancher/steve/security/advisories/GHSA-j5hq-5jcr-xwx7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-52280"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rancher/steve/commit/2175e090fe4b1e603a54e1cdc5148a2b1c11b4d9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2024-52280"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rancher/steve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-3281"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": " github.com/rancher/steve\u0027s users can issue watch commands for arbitrary resources"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.