GHSA-J56F-W52C-9VH2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cdrom: fix stack out-of-bounds read in CDROMVOLCTRL
mmc_ioctl_cdrom_volume() first reads the audio control mode page into a 32-byte stack buffer with cgc->buflen set to 24. If the device reports a block descriptor, the function increases cgc->buflen to include that descriptor and reads the page again.
For CDROMVOLCTRL, the function then builds a MODE SELECT parameter list by moving cgc->buffer forward by offset - 8 bytes. This drops the block descriptor from the outgoing payload and leaves a new 8-byte mode parameter header in front of the audio control page. However, cgc->buflen is left unchanged.
With a standard 8-byte block descriptor, cgc->buffer points at buffer + 8 but cgc->buflen remains 32. cdrom_mode_select() therefore asks the low level packet path to write 32 bytes from that adjusted pointer, reading 8 bytes past the end of the 32-byte stack buffer.
This is not hit by CDROMVOLREAD, and CDROMVOLCTRL only triggers it on drives that return a non-zero block descriptor length, which helps explain why it has gone unnoticed. The overread is also sent to the device as extra MODE SELECT payload, so it may not produce an obvious local failure.
Reduce cgc->buflen by the same amount as the buffer pointer adjustment so the MODE SELECT transfer covers only the intended parameter list.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68184"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:05Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncdrom: fix stack out-of-bounds read in CDROMVOLCTRL\n\nmmc_ioctl_cdrom_volume() first reads the audio control mode page into a\n32-byte stack buffer with cgc-\u003ebuflen set to 24. If the device reports a\nblock descriptor, the function increases cgc-\u003ebuflen to include that\ndescriptor and reads the page again.\n\nFor CDROMVOLCTRL, the function then builds a MODE SELECT parameter list\nby moving cgc-\u003ebuffer forward by offset - 8 bytes. This drops the block\ndescriptor from the outgoing payload and leaves a new 8-byte mode\nparameter header in front of the audio control page. However, cgc-\u003ebuflen\nis left unchanged.\n\nWith a standard 8-byte block descriptor, cgc-\u003ebuffer points at buffer + 8\nbut cgc-\u003ebuflen remains 32. cdrom_mode_select() therefore asks the low\nlevel packet path to write 32 bytes from that adjusted pointer, reading 8\nbytes past the end of the 32-byte stack buffer.\n\nThis is not hit by CDROMVOLREAD, and CDROMVOLCTRL only triggers it on\ndrives that return a non-zero block descriptor length, which helps explain\nwhy it has gone unnoticed. The overread is also sent to the device as\nextra MODE SELECT payload, so it may not produce an obvious local failure.\n\nReduce cgc-\u003ebuflen by the same amount as the buffer pointer adjustment so\nthe MODE SELECT transfer covers only the intended parameter list.",
"id": "GHSA-j56f-w52c-9vh2",
"modified": "2026-08-19T18:32:09Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68184"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0329b661349f42f9616f2733da67edffbbb8455d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35b68e24c5a69fa4545f46f05f6c849223034cb6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45c65df5339deea3cf204902aac383fe995941a7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7344c84e32413e5c8832f74b8a612b0194e5c051"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b27e195d4db8dea263050bdbeb11881b2999c9c6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d43c5c0c935522deae7339e0c2399365f3bf0016"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e150c9a10baee55d3bfbc96dbe66b205e8b4fd44"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3e2715a150066f09aa82c30fa983fb184ad6dd5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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