GHSA-J4FC-XRX5-PHGR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 09:30 – Updated: 2026-08-08 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: amlogic - avoid double cleanup in meson_crypto_probe()
When meson_allocate_chanlist() fails after a partial allocation, it already unwinds the allocated chanlist state through its local error path. meson_crypto_probe() then jump to error_flow and calls meson_free_chanlist() again, causing the same per-flow resources to be torn down twice. In the reproduced failure path, the second teardown re-entered crypto_engine_exit() on an already destroyed worker and KASAN reported a slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker().
Prevent double-free by handling partial allocation failures locally within meson_allocate_chanlist() and skipping the outer cleanup path.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available.
The bug was reproduced in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN on v7.1, using the reproducer under tools/testing/meson_crypto_probe. The reproducer forces the second dma_alloc_attrs() call in the gxl-crypto probe path to return NULL, making meson_allocate_chanlist() fail after partial initialization. On the unpatched kernel this reliably triggered a slab-use-after-free. With this fix applied, the same reproducer no longer emits any KASAN report and the probe fails cleanly with -ENOMEM.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0
Read of size 8 at addr ff1100010c057a68 by task insmod/265
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 265 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 7.1.0-rc2-00376-g810af9adc907-dirty #10 PREEMPT(lazy)
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0
print_report+0xcb/0x5e0
? __virt_addr_valid+0x21d/0x3f0
? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0
? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0
kasan_report+0xca/0x100
? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0
kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0
meson_crypto_probe+0x4d0/0xc10 [amlogic_gxl_crypto]
platform_probe+0x99/0x140
really_probe+0x1c6/0x6a0
? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10
__driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310
? acpi_driver_match_device+0xb0/0x100
driver_probe_device+0x48/0x210
? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10
__device_attach_driver+0x160/0x320
bus_for_each_drv+0x104/0x190
? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50
__device_attach+0x19d/0x3b0
? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x220
device_initial_probe+0x78/0xa0
bus_probe_device+0x5b/0x130
device_add+0xcfd/0x1430
? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10
? insert_resource+0x34/0x50
? lock_release+0xc9/0x290
platform_device_add+0x24e/0x590
? __pfx_meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x10/0x10 [meson_crypto_probe_repro]
meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x330/0xff0 [meson_crypto_probe_repro]
do_one_initcall+0xc0/0x450
? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50
? __create_object+0x59/0x80
? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60
do_init_module+0x27b/0x7d0
? __pfx_do_init_module+0x10/0x10
? kasan_quarantine_put+0x84/0x1d0
? kfree+0x32c/0x510
? load_module+0x561e/0x5ff0
load_module+0x54fe/0x5ff0
? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10
? security_file_permission+0x20/0x40
? kernel_read_file+0x23d/0x6e0
? mmap_region+0x235/0x4a0
? __pfx_kernel_read_file+0x10/0x10
? __file_has_perm+0x2c0/0x3e0
init_module_from_file+0x158/0x180
? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10
? __lock_acquire+0x45a/0x1ba0
? idempotent_init_module+0x315/0x610
? lock_release+0xc9/0x290
? lock
---truncated---
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64599"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-415"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-06T08:16:35Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: amlogic - avoid double cleanup in meson_crypto_probe()\n\nWhen meson_allocate_chanlist() fails after a partial allocation, it already\nunwinds the allocated chanlist state through its local error path.\nmeson_crypto_probe() then jump to error_flow and calls\nmeson_free_chanlist() again, causing the same per-flow resources to be torn\ndown twice. In the reproduced failure path, the second teardown\nre-entered crypto_engine_exit() on an already destroyed worker and KASAN\nreported a slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker().\n\nPrevent double-free by handling partial allocation failures locally within\nmeson_allocate_chanlist() and skipping the outer cleanup path.\n\nThe bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are\ndeveloping for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing\nv6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly\navailable.\n\nThe bug was reproduced in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN on v7.1,\nusing the reproducer under tools/testing/meson_crypto_probe. The reproducer\nforces the second dma_alloc_attrs() call in the gxl-crypto probe path to\nreturn NULL, making meson_allocate_chanlist() fail after partial\ninitialization. On the unpatched kernel this reliably triggered a\nslab-use-after-free. With this fix applied, the same reproducer no longer\nemits any KASAN report and the probe fails cleanly with -ENOMEM.\n\n ==================================================================\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0\n Read of size 8 at addr ff1100010c057a68 by task insmod/265\n\n CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 265 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 7.1.0-rc2-00376-g810af9adc907-dirty #10 PREEMPT(lazy)\n Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0\n print_report+0xcb/0x5e0\n ? __virt_addr_valid+0x21d/0x3f0\n ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0\n ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0\n kasan_report+0xca/0x100\n ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0\n kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0\n meson_crypto_probe+0x4d0/0xc10 [amlogic_gxl_crypto]\n platform_probe+0x99/0x140\n really_probe+0x1c6/0x6a0\n ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10\n __driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310\n ? acpi_driver_match_device+0xb0/0x100\n driver_probe_device+0x48/0x210\n ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10\n __device_attach_driver+0x160/0x320\n bus_for_each_drv+0x104/0x190\n ? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10\n ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50\n __device_attach+0x19d/0x3b0\n ? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10\n ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x220\n device_initial_probe+0x78/0xa0\n bus_probe_device+0x5b/0x130\n device_add+0xcfd/0x1430\n ? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10\n ? insert_resource+0x34/0x50\n ? lock_release+0xc9/0x290\n platform_device_add+0x24e/0x590\n ? __pfx_meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x10/0x10 [meson_crypto_probe_repro]\n meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x330/0xff0 [meson_crypto_probe_repro]\n do_one_initcall+0xc0/0x450\n ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10\n ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50\n ? __create_object+0x59/0x80\n ? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60\n do_init_module+0x27b/0x7d0\n ? __pfx_do_init_module+0x10/0x10\n ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x84/0x1d0\n ? kfree+0x32c/0x510\n ? load_module+0x561e/0x5ff0\n load_module+0x54fe/0x5ff0\n ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10\n ? security_file_permission+0x20/0x40\n ? kernel_read_file+0x23d/0x6e0\n ? mmap_region+0x235/0x4a0\n ? __pfx_kernel_read_file+0x10/0x10\n ? __file_has_perm+0x2c0/0x3e0\n init_module_from_file+0x158/0x180\n ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10\n ? __lock_acquire+0x45a/0x1ba0\n ? idempotent_init_module+0x315/0x610\n ? lock_release+0xc9/0x290\n ? lock\n---truncated---",
"id": "GHSA-j4fc-xrx5-phgr",
"modified": "2026-08-08T15:30:25Z",
"published": "2026-08-06T09:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64599"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b452019a4127f63c1f2147237fc287d1581f606"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d827ade51a24e18d81afb9f32756d339520a14c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6dda8406d8a3da2519c8b388d443d7357839cb63"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6effdbaca3cd8354540bdf42c7f5fb84412afeb7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84a00be9b736aa5dce902a290f62cbbbdcfab9ed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c2c48aa7a6be36d4c93da75d14d4b4f2f4168c81"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c80360b4e85099fc3835378a96a59c0a2480fb07"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f30e2b879bda14bc3e1524fba6f8ab9ec119da90"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.