GHSA-J47Q-HP6H-CPW3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-31 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: libiscsi: Validate the task named by a management response
__iscsi_complete_pdu() fetches the task for five response types from one place and checks only that the index resolved:
case ISCSI_OP_LOGOUT_RSP:
case ISCSI_OP_LOGIN_RSP:
case ISCSI_OP_TEXT_RSP:
case ISCSI_OP_SCSI_TMFUNC_RSP:
case ISCSI_OP_NOOP_IN:
task = iscsi_itt_to_task(conn, hdr->itt);
if (!task)
return ISCSI_ERR_BAD_ITT;
iscsi_itt_to_task() bounds the index against cmds_max and looks at nothing else, so a target can name any slot in the pool, including one that has never been used. task->conn is then NULL, and both iscsi_nop_out_rsp() and iscsi_complete_task() dereference it. One unsolicited NOP-In is enough; a Text Response carrying the same ITT crashes in iscsi_complete_task() instead.
Require the task to be in flight and not a SCSI command, the way iscsi_itt_to_ctask() does for the command opcodes.
[ 6.298634] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000c: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 6.298642] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000060-0x0000000000000067] [ 6.298652] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 111 Comm: iscsistart Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-ISCSI1-gf5098b6bae76 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 6.298654] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 6.298656] RIP: 0010:iscsi_nop_out_rsp.constprop.0+0x46/0x160 [ 6.298691] Code: c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 08 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 f5 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6b 58 48 8d 7d 60 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 c0 00 00 00 48 8b 45 60 48 39 c3 74 50 48 b8 00 [ 6.298698] RSP: 0018:ffff88806c907be8 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 6.298701] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888006116800 RCX: 0000000000000020 [ 6.298702] RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: ffff88800525d578 RDI: 0000000000000060 [ 6.298703] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 6.298706] R10: 0000000000000020 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 6.298706] R13: 000000000000002e R14: ffff8880056eb440 R15: ffff888006116800 [ 6.298707] FS: 00007fc02d1c2740(0000) GS:ffff8880b29bc000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6.298710] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6.298711] CR2: 000055fe3b56ddf8 CR3: 00000000053b9004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 6.298712] PKRU: 55555554 [ 6.298713] Call Trace: [ 6.298714] [ 6.298714] __iscsi_complete_pdu+0x13a8/0x22a0 [ 6.298758] iscsi_complete_pdu+0x54/0xa0 [ 6.298759] iscsi_tcp_hdr_recv_done+0x870/0x2c80 [ 6.298778] iscsi_tcp_recv_skb+0x31e/0xec0 [ 6.298800] iscsi_sw_tcp_recv+0x12f/0x390 [ 6.298804] __tcp_read_sock+0x1ab/0x810 [ 6.298812] iscsi_sw_tcp_data_ready+0x18b/0x510 [ 6.298814] tcp_rcv_established+0x1f56/0x3a00 [ 6.298842] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x449/0x960 [ 6.298847] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2245/0x3bc0
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99152"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-28T11:17:35Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: libiscsi: Validate the task named by a management response\n\n__iscsi_complete_pdu() fetches the task for five response types from one\nplace and checks only that the index resolved:\n\n case ISCSI_OP_LOGOUT_RSP:\n case ISCSI_OP_LOGIN_RSP:\n case ISCSI_OP_TEXT_RSP:\n case ISCSI_OP_SCSI_TMFUNC_RSP:\n case ISCSI_OP_NOOP_IN:\n task = iscsi_itt_to_task(conn, hdr-\u003eitt);\n if (!task)\n return ISCSI_ERR_BAD_ITT;\n\niscsi_itt_to_task() bounds the index against cmds_max and looks at\nnothing else, so a target can name any slot in the pool, including one\nthat has never been used. task-\u003econn is then NULL, and both\niscsi_nop_out_rsp() and iscsi_complete_task() dereference it. One\nunsolicited NOP-In is enough; a Text Response carrying the same ITT\ncrashes in iscsi_complete_task() instead.\n\nRequire the task to be in flight and not a SCSI command, the way\niscsi_itt_to_ctask() does for the command opcodes.\n\n[ 6.298634] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000c: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI\n[ 6.298642] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000060-0x0000000000000067]\n[ 6.298652] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 111 Comm: iscsistart Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-ISCSI1-gf5098b6bae76 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)\n[ 6.298654] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014\n[ 6.298656] RIP: 0010:iscsi_nop_out_rsp.constprop.0+0x46/0x160\n[ 6.298691] Code: c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 08 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 f5 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6b 58 48 8d 7d 60 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 \u003c80\u003e 3c 02 00 0f 85 c0 00 00 00 48 8b 45 60 48 39 c3 74 50 48 b8 00\n[ 6.298698] RSP: 0018:ffff88806c907be8 EFLAGS: 00010206\n[ 6.298701] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888006116800 RCX: 0000000000000020\n[ 6.298702] RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: ffff88800525d578 RDI: 0000000000000060\n[ 6.298703] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\n[ 6.298706] R10: 0000000000000020 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000\n[ 6.298706] R13: 000000000000002e R14: ffff8880056eb440 R15: ffff888006116800\n[ 6.298707] FS: 00007fc02d1c2740(0000) GS:ffff8880b29bc000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[ 6.298710] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[ 6.298711] CR2: 000055fe3b56ddf8 CR3: 00000000053b9004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0\n[ 6.298712] PKRU: 55555554\n[ 6.298713] Call Trace:\n[ 6.298714] \u003cIRQ\u003e\n[ 6.298714] __iscsi_complete_pdu+0x13a8/0x22a0\n[ 6.298758] iscsi_complete_pdu+0x54/0xa0\n[ 6.298759] iscsi_tcp_hdr_recv_done+0x870/0x2c80\n[ 6.298778] iscsi_tcp_recv_skb+0x31e/0xec0\n[ 6.298800] iscsi_sw_tcp_recv+0x12f/0x390\n[ 6.298804] __tcp_read_sock+0x1ab/0x810\n[ 6.298812] iscsi_sw_tcp_data_ready+0x18b/0x510\n[ 6.298814] tcp_rcv_established+0x1f56/0x3a00\n[ 6.298842] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x449/0x960\n[ 6.298847] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2245/0x3bc0",
"id": "GHSA-j47q-hp6h-cpw3",
"modified": "2026-10-31T15:30:22Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T12:31:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99152"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11bffcd9cb346732eab2914ef44fe777a3f0b585"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55a65ef61e2775aeb18fda63bd1959fa8b41f936"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b56229cc152095fbe4e4ff537cb206c4aa41610"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77134cf996bab55683f0ceafb9e300d97ac046f8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a7a473aec51195778a54fdd71f20fda3047b8ef"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf4035656852a386fecb5d6217710a1bde536e76"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e96ae694c5038aae84142b64e41b56324b7af9a7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f721487523d45941aed4b0ac8d829b0461a7d860"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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