GHSA-J396-GV6V-75WX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: Preserve TLB control (i.e. pending TLB flush) on failed VMRUN
Don't reset the VMCB's TLB control back to "do nothing" on a failed VMRUN, as empirical testing shows that the CPU performs the requested TLB flush if and only if VMRUN is successful, i.e. clearing TLB control on a failed VMRUN effectively drops a TLB flush.
Explicitly track the need to flush all ASIDs on a per-CPU basis, as the ASID reuse condition is tied to the pCPU, not to the vCPU. As a bonus, this also obviates the need to avoid clobbering FLUSH_ALL_ASID with TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID, e.g. in svm_flush_tlb_asid().
Deliberately don't bother saving/restoring the "old" tlb_ctl on failure, in quotes because it's not exactly the old tlb_ctl, it's the tlb_ctl from after pre_svm_run(), but before updating tlb_ctl for flush_all_asids. If VMRUN fails and TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID is forced, then the next successful run of the VMCB may unnecessarily flush all ASIDs, which strictly speaking could result in noisy neighbor issues. However, the fact that new_asid() is already guest-triggerable, because of KVM's flawed behavior of clearing the ASID on emulated INIT, means that a guest can already trigger a flush of all ASIDs at roughly the same rate. And once KVM stops clobbering the ASID on emulated INIT, or assigns a static ASID to each vCPU, this flaw goes away.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98715"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:25Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: SVM: Preserve TLB control (i.e. pending TLB flush) on failed VMRUN\n\nDon\u0027t reset the VMCB\u0027s TLB control back to \"do nothing\" on a failed VMRUN,\nas empirical testing shows that the CPU performs the requested TLB flush if\nand only if VMRUN is successful, i.e. clearing TLB control on a failed\nVMRUN effectively drops a TLB flush.\n\nExplicitly track the need to flush all ASIDs on a per-CPU basis, as the\nASID reuse condition is tied to the pCPU, not to the vCPU. As a bonus,\nthis also obviates the need to avoid clobbering FLUSH_ALL_ASID with\nTLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID, e.g. in svm_flush_tlb_asid().\n\nDeliberately don\u0027t bother saving/restoring the \"old\" tlb_ctl on failure,\nin quotes because it\u0027s not exactly the old tlb_ctl, it\u0027s the tlb_ctl from\nafter pre_svm_run(), but before updating tlb_ctl for flush_all_asids. If\nVMRUN fails and TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID is forced, then the next\nsuccessful run of the VMCB *may* unnecessarily flush all ASIDs, which\nstrictly speaking could result in noisy neighbor issues. However, the\nfact that new_asid() is already guest-triggerable, because of KVM\u0027s flawed\nbehavior of clearing the ASID on emulated INIT, means that a guest can\nalready trigger a flush of all ASIDs at roughly the same rate. And once\nKVM stops clobbering the ASID on emulated INIT, *or* assigns a static ASID\nto each vCPU, this flaw goes away.",
"id": "GHSA-j396-gv6v-75wx",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:32:00Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:32:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98715"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/60d93c27859fb3ec5b5a689e24de303f166477d0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd873c3d1b5240e80365f09e758e8c96b88a7cdb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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