GHSA-J34J-9955-32CV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-13 09:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: panasonic-laptop: Fix sentinel write past pcc->sinf[]
acpi_pcc_retrieve_biosdata() rejects SINF packages only when pcc->num_sifr is strictly less than hkey->package.count, then unconditionally writes a trailing sentinel at pcc->sinf[hkey->package.count]. But pcc->sinf[] is allocated with exactly pcc->num_sifr elements (valid indices 0..num_sifr-1), so that write needs num_sifr strictly greater than package.count to stay in bounds -- num_sifr == package.count passes the existing check but still overflows by one element.
This is exactly the case probe()'s existing num_sifr++ workaround ("Some DSDT-s have an off-by-one bug where the SINF package count is one higher than the SQTY reported value") is written to accommodate: when a DSDT's SINF package count equals SQTY+1, the workaround makes num_sifr equal to package.count, which is precisely the boundary that overflows here. Found via UBSan (array-index-out-of-bounds) on hardware where HKEY.SQTY returns 37 and HKEY.SINF()'s package has 38 elements: num_sifr becomes 38 after the += 1 workaround, the loop correctly fills indices 0..37, and the sentinel write then targets index 38, one past the end -- a silent 4-byte heap overflow on kernels without CONFIG_UBSAN.
Tightening the rejection check to num_sifr <= package.count would avoid the overflow but breaks probe() entirely on exactly this hardware, since num_sifr == package.count is the case the off-by-one workaround exists to support. Nothing else in the driver reads this sentinel value back, so simply skip the write when there is no room for it instead.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89436"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nplatform/x86: panasonic-laptop: Fix sentinel write past pcc-\u003esinf[]\n\nacpi_pcc_retrieve_biosdata() rejects SINF packages only when\npcc-\u003enum_sifr is strictly less than hkey-\u003epackage.count, then\nunconditionally writes a trailing sentinel at\npcc-\u003esinf[hkey-\u003epackage.count]. But pcc-\u003esinf[] is allocated with\nexactly pcc-\u003enum_sifr elements (valid indices 0..num_sifr-1), so that\nwrite needs num_sifr strictly greater than package.count to stay in\nbounds -- num_sifr == package.count passes the existing check but\nstill overflows by one element.\n\nThis is exactly the case probe()\u0027s existing num_sifr++ workaround\n(\"Some DSDT-s have an off-by-one bug where the SINF package count is\none higher than the SQTY reported value\") is written to accommodate:\nwhen a DSDT\u0027s SINF package count equals SQTY+1, the workaround makes\nnum_sifr equal to package.count, which is precisely the boundary that\noverflows here. Found via UBSan (array-index-out-of-bounds) on\nhardware where HKEY.SQTY returns 37 and HKEY.SINF()\u0027s package has 38\nelements: num_sifr becomes 38 after the += 1 workaround, the loop\ncorrectly fills indices 0..37, and the sentinel write then targets\nindex 38, one past the end -- a silent 4-byte heap overflow on kernels\nwithout CONFIG_UBSAN.\n\nTightening the rejection check to num_sifr \u003c= package.count would\navoid the overflow but breaks probe() entirely on exactly this\nhardware, since num_sifr == package.count is the case the off-by-one\nworkaround exists to support. Nothing else in the driver reads this\nsentinel value back, so simply skip the write when there is no room\nfor it instead.",
"id": "GHSA-j34j-9955-32cv",
"modified": "2026-09-13T09:32:11Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89436"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/329f10d8be193bf36af124e00b9dd6644cd71724"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a93df956ee4d903735b6d395362c839cb1dc07e3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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