GHSA-J327-5J79-P464
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: fbnic: use the Rx queue napi pointer to find the napi vector
The queue management ndos pick the napi vector for an Rx queue with: nv = fbn->napi[idx % fbn->num_napi];
The issue is this is only correct in the cases where there are no standalone Tx vectors. In those cases we were allocating the Tx vectors first and then the Rx so the queues would be pointing to Tx NAPI vectors instead of the Rx ones.
The mapping the ndos want is already recorded. fbnic_set_netif_napi() publishes it with netif_queue_set_napi(), which stores the napi pointer in netdev_rx_queue.napi, and fbnic_reset_netif_napi() clears it again. Both run under the netdev instance lock that the queue management ndos also hold, so the pointer can be read directly.
Use it and drop the divide. The pointer is NULL exactly while the datapath is down, so fbnic_queue_mem_alloc() can reject that case rather than reaching into freed state: netdev_rx_queue_restart() calls it before it tests netif_running(), and fbnic_pm_suspend() leaves netif_running() true across a PCIe recovery that never completes, so a queue restart can arrive after fbnic_stop() has freed the rings and the vectors. fbnic_stop() clears the association in fbnic_reset_netif_queues() before fbnic_free_napi_vectors(), so the NULL is always published first. fbnic_queue_start() and fbnic_queue_stop() need no check of their own, as netdev_rx_queue_reconfig() only reaches them once fbnic_queue_mem_alloc() has succeeded under the same instance lock.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98617"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:14Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\neth: fbnic: use the Rx queue napi pointer to find the napi vector\n\nThe queue management ndos pick the napi vector for an Rx queue with:\n\tnv = fbn-\u003enapi[idx % fbn-\u003enum_napi];\n\nThe issue is this is only correct in the cases where there are no\nstandalone Tx vectors. In those cases we were allocating the Tx vectors\nfirst and then the Rx so the queues would be pointing to Tx NAPI vectors\ninstead of the Rx ones.\n\nThe mapping the ndos want is already recorded. fbnic_set_netif_napi()\npublishes it with netif_queue_set_napi(), which stores the napi pointer\nin netdev_rx_queue.napi, and fbnic_reset_netif_napi() clears it again.\nBoth run under the netdev instance lock that the queue management ndos\nalso hold, so the pointer can be read directly.\n\nUse it and drop the divide. The pointer is NULL exactly while the\ndatapath is down, so fbnic_queue_mem_alloc() can reject that case rather\nthan reaching into freed state: netdev_rx_queue_restart() calls it\nbefore it tests netif_running(), and fbnic_pm_suspend() leaves\nnetif_running() true across a PCIe recovery that never completes, so a\nqueue restart can arrive after fbnic_stop() has freed the rings and the\nvectors. fbnic_stop() clears the association in\nfbnic_reset_netif_queues() before fbnic_free_napi_vectors(), so the\nNULL is always published first. fbnic_queue_start() and\nfbnic_queue_stop() need no check of their own, as\nnetdev_rx_queue_reconfig() only reaches them once fbnic_queue_mem_alloc()\nhas succeeded under the same instance lock.",
"id": "GHSA-j327-5j79-p464",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:31:56Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:31:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98617"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fb569cf3bf97e552f465b2c719e36b48ae7c18b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b5d9e9d4d0c13bc8b60d8d97e7a07fb25fea639e"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.