GHSA-J2JM-9CR2-X48X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-26 12:31 – Updated: 2025-11-04 00:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

md/raid5: avoid BUG_ON() while continue reshape after reassembling

Currently, mdadm support --revert-reshape to abort the reshape while reassembling, as the test 07revert-grow. However, following BUG_ON() can be triggerred by the test:

kernel BUG at drivers/md/raid5.c:6278! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI irq event stamp: 158985 CPU: 6 PID: 891 Comm: md0_reshape Not tainted 6.9.0-03335-g7592a0b0049a #94 RIP: 0010:reshape_request+0x3f1/0xe60 Call Trace: raid5_sync_request+0x43d/0x550 md_do_sync+0xb7a/0x2110 md_thread+0x294/0x2b0 kthread+0x147/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x59/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

Root cause is that --revert-reshape update the raid_disks from 5 to 4, while reshape position is still set, and after reassembling the array, reshape position will be read from super block, then during reshape the checking of 'writepos' that is caculated by old reshape position will fail.

Fix this panic the easy way first, by converting the BUG_ON() to WARN_ON(), and stop the reshape if checkings fail.

Noted that mdadm must fix --revert-shape as well, and probably md/raid should enhance metadata validation as well, however this means reassemble will fail and there must be user tools to fix the wrong metadata.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-43914"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-26T11:15:05Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmd/raid5: avoid BUG_ON() while continue reshape after reassembling\n\nCurrently, mdadm support --revert-reshape to abort the reshape while\nreassembling, as the test 07revert-grow. However, following BUG_ON()\ncan be triggerred by the test:\n\nkernel BUG at drivers/md/raid5.c:6278!\ninvalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI\nirq event stamp: 158985\nCPU: 6 PID: 891 Comm: md0_reshape Not tainted 6.9.0-03335-g7592a0b0049a #94\nRIP: 0010:reshape_request+0x3f1/0xe60\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n raid5_sync_request+0x43d/0x550\n md_do_sync+0xb7a/0x2110\n md_thread+0x294/0x2b0\n kthread+0x147/0x1c0\n ret_from_fork+0x59/0x70\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nRoot cause is that --revert-reshape update the raid_disks from 5 to 4,\nwhile reshape position is still set, and after reassembling the array,\nreshape position will be read from super block, then during reshape the\nchecking of \u0027writepos\u0027 that is caculated by old reshape position will\nfail.\n\nFix this panic the easy way first, by converting the BUG_ON() to\nWARN_ON(), and stop the reshape if checkings fail.\n\nNoted that mdadm must fix --revert-shape as well, and probably md/raid\nshould enhance metadata validation as well, however this means\nreassemble will fail and there must be user tools to fix the wrong\nmetadata.",
  "id": "GHSA-j2jm-9cr2-x48x",
  "modified": "2025-11-04T00:31:18Z",
  "published": "2024-08-26T12:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43914"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c92f8c1c456d556f15cbf51667b385026b2e6a0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/305a5170dc5cf3d395bb4c4e9239bca6d0b54b49"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b33740c1750a39e046339ff9240e954f0156707"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4811d6e5d9f4090c3e0ff9890eb24077108046ab"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b33c468d543f6a83de2d61f09fec74b27e19fd2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/775a9ba16c9ffe98fe54ebf14e55d5660f2bf600"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf0ff69a42a3d2d46876d0514ecf13dffc516666"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c384dd4f1fb3b14a2fd199360701cc163ea88705"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/10/msg00003.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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