GHSA-J294-CF74-GQ7Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Nullify "have run CPUs" mask pointer when freeing it
Nullify have_run_cpus when freeing the mask, particularly in the error path of __sev_guest_init(), so that KVM doesn't have to subtly use sev->active to track whether or not the mask has been freed. As pointed out by Sashiko, blindly freeing the mask in sev_vm_destroy() results in a double-free if the mask is freed if __sev_guest_init() fails.
Throw the logic in a helper as nullifying the pointer is frustratingly difficult and weird due to have_run_cpus being a single-entry array when CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=n. Deliberately don't use CPUMASK_VAR_NULL, as it's not directly assignable when the cpumask is on-stack, e.g. requires using a local variable and a memcpy(), which is beyond ridiculous. Furthermore, while clearing the on-stack bitmask is an unnecessary and arguably unwanted side effect, KVM absolutely relies on '0' being the "null" value given that the struct is zero-allocated.
Opportunistically add an alloc() helper to pair with free(); there are just enough call sites to make doing so worthwhile.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98719"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:25Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: SEV: Nullify \"have run CPUs\" mask pointer when freeing it\n\nNullify have_run_cpus when freeing the mask, particularly in the error path\nof __sev_guest_init(), so that KVM doesn\u0027t have to subtly use sev-\u003eactive\nto track whether or not the mask has been freed. As pointed out by Sashiko,\nblindly freeing the mask in sev_vm_destroy() results in a double-free if\nthe mask is freed if __sev_guest_init() fails.\n\nThrow the logic in a helper as nullifying the pointer is frustratingly\ndifficult and weird due to have_run_cpus being a single-entry array when\nCPUMASK_OFFSTACK=n. Deliberately don\u0027t use CPUMASK_VAR_NULL, as it\u0027s not\ndirectly assignable when the cpumask is on-stack, e.g. requires using a\nlocal variable and a memcpy(), which is beyond ridiculous. Furthermore,\nwhile clearing the on-stack bitmask is an unnecessary and arguably unwanted\nside effect, KVM absolutely relies on \u00270\u0027 being the \"null\" value given that\nthe struct is zero-allocated.\n\nOpportunistically add an alloc() helper to pair with free(); there are just\nenough call sites to make doing so worthwhile.",
"id": "GHSA-j294-cf74-gq7q",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:32:00Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:32:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98719"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fbc7fec2242de6c3dcea6de55573c428e820173"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8abbc76120a74bfba1851bd97528099d715e45c6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1de3ebf59507e0edacaa5cfa2225bc1869e1b63"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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