GHSA-J264-PFCP-HF7W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 09:31 – Updated: 2026-11-20 09:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/poll: cancel all matching requests in one pass
With IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL, __io_async_cancel() calls io_try_cancel() until nothing is found, and io_poll_cancel() cancels one request per call, starting each lookup at the beginning of the hash. A cancelled request stays hashed until its task work runs, so every lookup walks past the ones already cancelled. Cancelling K of N pending polls visits about K*N/2 requests in one io_uring_enter(), with uring_lock held.
A single CANCEL_FD|ALL on 80000 polls on one eventfd takes 17.06s, 0.02s with this change. With voluntary preemption the soft lockup watchdog fires:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 26s! [repro:100] RIP: 0010:io_cancel_req_match+0x19/0xa0 io_poll_cancel+0x73/0x170 io_try_cancel+0x7b/0xf0 __io_async_cancel+0x41/0x110
Walk the hash once and cancel every match, as io_cancel_remove() does for futex and waitid. Cancel by user_data only needs its own bucket. __io_async_cancel() still loops until nothing is found, so a request that io-wq parks in the poll hash meanwhile is still cancelled.
A cancel that matches one request now walks the whole hash twice instead of stopping at the match.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99796"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T08:18:37Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring/poll: cancel all matching requests in one pass\n\nWith IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL, __io_async_cancel() calls io_try_cancel()\nuntil nothing is found, and io_poll_cancel() cancels one request per\ncall, starting each lookup at the beginning of the hash. A cancelled\nrequest stays hashed until its task work runs, so every lookup walks\npast the ones already cancelled. Cancelling K of N pending polls visits\nabout K*N/2 requests in one io_uring_enter(), with uring_lock held.\n\nA single CANCEL_FD|ALL on 80000 polls on one eventfd takes 17.06s,\n0.02s with this change. With voluntary preemption the soft lockup\nwatchdog fires:\n\n watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 26s! [repro:100]\n RIP: 0010:io_cancel_req_match+0x19/0xa0\n io_poll_cancel+0x73/0x170\n io_try_cancel+0x7b/0xf0\n __io_async_cancel+0x41/0x110\n\nWalk the hash once and cancel every match, as io_cancel_remove() does\nfor futex and waitid. Cancel by user_data only needs its own bucket.\n__io_async_cancel() still loops until nothing is found, so a request\nthat io-wq parks in the poll hash meanwhile is still cancelled.\n\nA cancel that matches one request now walks the whole hash twice instead\nof stopping at the match.",
"id": "GHSA-j264-pfcp-hf7w",
"modified": "2026-11-20T09:31:34Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T09:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99796"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5310b477e619209b0cceb00b71ebc05a3e89360b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9073da4d5bd87c71235d909512c478e8a13a5818"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9eff9c07e927dcd9c57150cd6fb3d4ec76f00480"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e409e1b03059c544d271c7f8e1215c5c0c62f278"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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