GHSA-HX9C-7JVW-48J5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-06 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-06 09:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: validate TX skb length in send_sync
btintel_pcie_prepare_tx() copies skb->len bytes into a fixed BTINTEL_PCIE_BUFFER_SIZE (4096) DMA slot via an unchecked memcpy. Oversized packets are currently rejected only in btintel_pcie_send_frame(); any future caller of btintel_pcie_send_sync() would silently overflow the DMA buffer.
Add the bounds check in btintel_pcie_send_sync() itself, right before skb_push() and the DMA copy.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98296"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T09:18:20Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: btintel_pcie: validate TX skb length in send_sync\n\nbtintel_pcie_prepare_tx() copies skb-\u003elen bytes into a fixed\nBTINTEL_PCIE_BUFFER_SIZE (4096) DMA slot via an unchecked memcpy.\nOversized packets are currently rejected only in\nbtintel_pcie_send_frame(); any future caller of\nbtintel_pcie_send_sync() would silently overflow the DMA buffer.\n\nAdd the bounds check in btintel_pcie_send_sync() itself, right\nbefore skb_push() and the DMA copy.",
"id": "GHSA-hx9c-7jvw-48j5",
"modified": "2026-10-06T09:31:33Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98296"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4b837ebd0ea21ae5cc26f02dc042edc6fe7b46b9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84f353256e170dc4865d45007d1bc446ed566da7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c298a61e18029401486c40298a50fbeea7e7b663"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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