GHSA-HWWJ-MW3Q-359R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: Mark LVID buffer as uptodate before marking it dirty
When an I/O error occurs while writing the Logical Volume Integrity
Descriptor (LVID) buffer to the block device, the block layer's completion
handler (end_buffer_write_sync()) clears the BH_Uptodate flag on the
buffer. However, the buffer still contains valid LVID data in memory. If
the filesystem is subsequently remounted read-write or synced,
udf_open_lvid() or udf_sync_fs() will modify the LVID buffer and call
mark_buffer_dirty(). This triggers a spurious
WARN_ON_ONCE(!buffer_uptodate(bh)) warning in mark_buffer_dirty()
because the buffer is not marked uptodate, even though its in-memory
contents are valid and are about to be overwritten.
To prevent this spurious warning, unconditionally set the BH_Uptodate
flag before calling mark_buffer_dirty() in udf_open_lvid() and
udf_sync_fs(). This acknowledges that the in-memory buffer is valid and
matches the workaround previously applied to udf_close_lvid() in commit
853a0c25baf9 ("udf: Mark LVID buffer as uptodate before marking it dirty").
Extending this workaround ensures consistent behavior across all LVID
updates.
Buffer I/O error on dev loop0, logical block 128, lost sync page write ------------[ cut here ]------------ !buffer_uptodate(bh) WARNING: fs/buffer.c:1087 at mark_buffer_dirty+0x299/0x410 fs/buffer.c:1087 ... Call Trace: udf_open_lvid+0x369/0x5b0 fs/udf/super.c:2078 udf_reconfigure+0x336/0x540 fs/udf/super.c:679 reconfigure_super+0x232/0x8f0 fs/super.c:1080 vfs_cmd_reconfigure fs/fsopen.c:268 [inline] vfs_fsconfig_locked+0x171/0x320 fs/fsopen.c:297 __do_sys_fsconfig fs/fsopen.c:463 [inline] __se_sys_fsconfig+0x6b9/0x810 fs/fsopen.c:350 do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93140"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:18:08Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nudf: Mark LVID buffer as uptodate before marking it dirty\n\nWhen an I/O error occurs while writing the Logical Volume Integrity\nDescriptor (LVID) buffer to the block device, the block layer\u0027s completion\nhandler (`end_buffer_write_sync()`) clears the `BH_Uptodate` flag on the\nbuffer. However, the buffer still contains valid LVID data in memory. If\nthe filesystem is subsequently remounted read-write or synced,\n`udf_open_lvid()` or `udf_sync_fs()` will modify the LVID buffer and call\n`mark_buffer_dirty()`. This triggers a spurious\n`WARN_ON_ONCE(!buffer_uptodate(bh))` warning in `mark_buffer_dirty()`\nbecause the buffer is not marked uptodate, even though its in-memory\ncontents are valid and are about to be overwritten.\n\nTo prevent this spurious warning, unconditionally set the `BH_Uptodate`\nflag before calling `mark_buffer_dirty()` in `udf_open_lvid()` and\n`udf_sync_fs()`. This acknowledges that the in-memory buffer is valid and\nmatches the workaround previously applied to `udf_close_lvid()` in commit\n853a0c25baf9 (\"udf: Mark LVID buffer as uptodate before marking it dirty\").\nExtending this workaround ensures consistent behavior across all LVID\nupdates.\n\nBuffer I/O error on dev loop0, logical block 128, lost sync page write\n------------[ cut here ]------------\n!buffer_uptodate(bh)\nWARNING: fs/buffer.c:1087 at mark_buffer_dirty+0x299/0x410 fs/buffer.c:1087\n...\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n udf_open_lvid+0x369/0x5b0 fs/udf/super.c:2078\n udf_reconfigure+0x336/0x540 fs/udf/super.c:679\n reconfigure_super+0x232/0x8f0 fs/super.c:1080\n vfs_cmd_reconfigure fs/fsopen.c:268 [inline]\n vfs_fsconfig_locked+0x171/0x320 fs/fsopen.c:297\n __do_sys_fsconfig fs/fsopen.c:463 [inline]\n __se_sys_fsconfig+0x6b9/0x810 fs/fsopen.c:350\n do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94\n \u003c/TASK\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-hwwj-mw3q-359r",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:12Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93140"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11afe1912140f79d5af3091a54b181ef72fce1a5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/359cea636f4a74a96c01a8050f155e12840c079a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8034ddf4751d9143c5ef7eebe3d4f33218fdd378"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4c4e38b356ad4c1f90478124922917489137c08"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4058355d27488a3cd31c60c032335f77c4fdcfc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e6461ef34f91ad7dbffdf912b3d661a7dd892931"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee477e5204f764444e60699280abf5936c2a6ae6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb0601134c7e51728bd098abc6909315de1e5d86"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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