GHSA-HW95-CHC9-4W36

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-22 18:31 – Updated: 2025-11-26 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvmet: pci-epf: Do not complete commands twice if nvmet_req_init() fails

Have nvmet_req_init() and req->execute() complete failed commands.

Description of the problem: nvmet_req_init() calls __nvmet_req_complete() internally upon failure, e.g., unsupported opcode, which calls the "queue_response" callback, this results in nvmet_pci_epf_queue_response() being called, which will call nvmet_pci_epf_complete_iod() if data_len is 0 or if dma_dir is different from DMA_TO_DEVICE. This results in a double completion as nvmet_pci_epf_exec_iod_work() also calls nvmet_pci_epf_complete_iod() when nvmet_req_init() fails.

Steps to reproduce: On the host send a command with an unsupported opcode with nvme-cli, For example the admin command "security receive" $ sudo nvme security-recv /dev/nvme0n1 -n1 -x4096

This triggers a double completion as nvmet_req_init() fails and nvmet_pci_epf_queue_response() is called, here iod->dma_dir is still in the default state of "DMA_NONE" as set by default in nvmet_pci_epf_alloc_iod(), so nvmet_pci_epf_complete_iod() is called. Because nvmet_req_init() failed nvmet_pci_epf_complete_iod() is also called in nvmet_pci_epf_exec_iod_work() leading to a double completion. This not only sends two completions to the host but also corrupts the state of the PCI NVMe target leading to kernel oops.

This patch lets nvmet_req_init() and req->execute() complete all failed commands, and removes the double completion case in nvmet_pci_epf_exec_iod_work() therefore fixing the edge cases where double completions occurred.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-38658"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-908"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-22T16:15:40Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvmet: pci-epf: Do not complete commands twice if nvmet_req_init() fails\n\nHave nvmet_req_init() and req-\u003eexecute() complete failed commands.\n\nDescription of the problem:\nnvmet_req_init() calls __nvmet_req_complete() internally upon failure,\ne.g., unsupported opcode, which calls the \"queue_response\" callback,\nthis results in nvmet_pci_epf_queue_response() being called, which will\ncall nvmet_pci_epf_complete_iod() if data_len is 0 or if dma_dir is\ndifferent from DMA_TO_DEVICE. This results in a double completion as\nnvmet_pci_epf_exec_iod_work() also calls nvmet_pci_epf_complete_iod()\nwhen nvmet_req_init() fails.\n\nSteps to reproduce:\nOn the host send a command with an unsupported opcode with nvme-cli,\nFor example the admin command \"security receive\"\n$ sudo nvme security-recv /dev/nvme0n1 -n1 -x4096\n\nThis triggers a double completion as nvmet_req_init() fails and\nnvmet_pci_epf_queue_response() is called, here iod-\u003edma_dir is still\nin the default state of \"DMA_NONE\" as set by default in\nnvmet_pci_epf_alloc_iod(), so nvmet_pci_epf_complete_iod() is called.\nBecause nvmet_req_init() failed nvmet_pci_epf_complete_iod() is also\ncalled in nvmet_pci_epf_exec_iod_work() leading to a double completion.\nThis not only sends two completions to the host but also corrupts the\nstate of the PCI NVMe target leading to kernel oops.\n\nThis patch lets nvmet_req_init() and req-\u003eexecute() complete all failed\ncommands, and removes the double completion case in\nnvmet_pci_epf_exec_iod_work() therefore fixing the edge cases where\ndouble completions occurred.",
  "id": "GHSA-hw95-chc9-4w36",
  "modified": "2025-11-26T18:31:01Z",
  "published": "2025-08-22T18:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38658"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/746d0ac5a07d5da952ef258dd4d75f0b26c96476"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a535c0b10060bc8c174a7964b0f98064ee0c4774"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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